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INTRODUCTION
n Thursday, June 23, 2016, Britain1 went to the polls, in
which a 7: percent ma=ority voted for “BreSitO” the colloL
'uial term for Britain’s eSit from the European UnionKWithin a
year, British Prime Minister Theresa May invoked Art. 50 of the
1. Hor the purposes of this articleO the names “Britain” and the “United
Dingdom” are used interchangeably to refer to the =urisdiction officially known
as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
O
2017] Intellectual Property Post-Brexit 133
Treaty of Lisbon,2 formally commencing the process of with-
drawing Britain from the European Union.3 By April 2019, the
formal separation is supposed to be complete.4 The referendum
result and subsequent events have sparked fears about what
will happen to intellectual property investments in Britain and
the European Union in the coming years. This concern is justi-
fied, as post-Brexit arrangements between the European Union
2. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 [hereinafter
Treaty of Lisbon]. Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon states:
1. AnyMember State may decide to withdraw from the Union
in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the
European Council of its intention. In the light of the guide-
lines provided by the European Council, the Union shall ne-
gotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting
out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of
the framework for its future relationship with the Union.
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Arti-
cle 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the
consent of the European Parliament.
Id.
3. The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill became law after
passing through Parliament on March 13, 2017. European Union (Notification
of Withdrawal) Act 2017, c. 9 (Eng.), http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/9/contents/enacted/data.htm. On March 29, 2017, a
letter from Prime Minister May announcing Britain’s intention to withdraw
from the EU was delivered in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon and trig-
gered Article 50. Theresa May, British Prime Minister, Letter to Donald Tusk
(Mar. 29, 2017), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-letter-text/text-of-
pm-mays-letter-to-eus-tusk-triggering-brexit-process-idUKKBN1701JH.
4. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, art. 50. Article 50 states that:
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from
the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or,
failing that, two years after the notification referred to in par-
agraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with
the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend
this period.
Id.
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and Britain, with respect to intellectual property laws, have yet
to be determined.
Faving developed the world’s largest “single marketO” the EuL
ropean Union, which is comprised of twenty-eight member na-
tionsO is currently one of the world’s largest economies5 and a
global intellectual property hub. Recent reports indicate that
products of intellectual property intensive industries account for
88 percent of EU imports and 90 percent of EU exports.6 Mean-
while, intellectual property intensive sectors account for around
26 percent of EU employment and 39 percent, or EUR 4.7 tril-
lion, of EU gross domestic product (GDP) per annum.7 Within
Britain, intellectual property intensive industries amount to
37.4 percent of GDP and provide 26.7 percent of employment.8
Using a variety of indicators, including intellectual property sta-
tistics, to rank nations according to global innovation trends, the
2016 Global Innovation Index reported that European countries
dominated the 0top ten’ list of the world’s most innovative na-
tions,9 with Britain ranking third.10 European intellectual prop-
erty offices account for a siRable proportion of the world’s filing
concentrations for patents, trademarks, and designs,11 while a
5. EUROSTAT, THE EU IN THE WORLD 79 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/euro-
stat/documents/3217494/7589036/KS-EX-16-001-EN-N.pdf/bcacb30c-0be9-
4c2e-a06d-4b1daead493e. This statistical report states that the twenty-eight
member European UnionO “accounted for a :9K4* share of the world’s GZP” in
2014, which was the largest single share ahead of the USA at 22.2%. Id. It
states that the European Union “was the world’s largest eSporter and importer
of services in 2014O” id. at 96, and comprised 6K3* of the world’s population in
2015, id. at 21, fig. 1.1.
6. OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 63 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/intellectual-property/docs/joint-report-
epo-ohim-final-version_en.pdf.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 83, fig. 14.
9. THEGLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2016:WINNINGWITHGLOBAL INNOVATION
14 (Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin, & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent eds., 2016),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2016.pdf. In 2016, Euro-
pean nations accounted for eight of the top ten most innovative nations. Id.
The ranking was as follows: Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the
United States, Finland, Singapore, Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Germany. Id.
10. Id.
11. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 6 (2015),
www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_943_2015.pdf.
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majority of the top fifty applicants for international Madrid Sys-
tem trademarks are European companies.12 A study into the in-
ternational mobility of inventors also reported that, between
2006@:I<IO over 9I percent of the world’s immigrant inventors
chose European jurisdictions as their new homes,13 with Britain
ranking third in the world.14 Intellectual property is thus ex-
tremely important to Britain and the broader European Union.
Given the value of intellectual property investments to Britain
and the rest of the European Union, as well as the importance
that the European Union has placed on intellectual property
laws in the generation of economic activity, it is in the interests
of both Britain and the rest of the European Union to establish
a plan that will maintain stability for European intellectual
property arrangements following Brexit. Indeed, it may be in the
interests of both Britain and the broader European Union to go
a step further and maintain de facto harmonization of British
and EU intellectual property laws.
The journey towards Brexit involves a two-year Art. 50(2) ne-
gotiating phase,15 in which administrative arrangements should
be settled between Britain and the European Union. The focus
in this phase is on “setting out the arrangements for WBritain’sV
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future rela-
tionship with the UnionK”16 In practice, this involves resolving
issues such as the status of EU citizens residing in Britain and
British citizens residing in the European Union, borders (such
as the land border between Northern Ireland, which will be in-
cluded in Brexit, and the Republic of Ireland, which will remain
in the European Union), and a financial settlement.17 If the par-
12. In 2015, thirty-seven of the top fifty Madrid System trademark appli-
cants were European-based companies. WORLD INTEL. PROP. ORG., MADRID
YEARLY REVIEW 16 (2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pub-
docs/en/wipo_pub_940_2015.pdf.
13. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 2013 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS 25 (2013), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intprop-
erty/941/wipo_pub_941_2013.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, art. 50.
16. Id.
17. Michael Barnier, Chief Negotiator for the Preparation and Conduct of
the Negotiations with the U.K., The Conditions for Reaching an Agreement in
the Negotiations with the United Kingdom, SPEECH/17/723 (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-723_en.htm.
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ties cannot agree, or Britain is unwilling to accede to EU de-
mands, the European Parliament can veto any settlement.18
Britain’s stated position is thatO “no deal for Britain is better
than a bad deal for BritainK”19 The uncertainty, however, caused
by BreSit occurring without any agreement as to Britain’s future
relationship with the European Union would be a negative sce-
nario for both parties. As such, both will presumably try to avoid
this outcome.
In addition, Britain would like the primary negotiations to be
accompanied by secondary negotiations towards an agreement
or agreements concerning specific issues, such as trade, customs,
and intellectual property law. EU leaders, however, have ex-
pressed a lack of interest or intent to engage in the secondary
negotiations until the primary negotiations have been con-
cluded.20
Regardless of political posturing, the nature of intellectual
property laws and interests within Europe mean that, in order
to avert very predictable and costly problems, some jurisdic-
tional restructuring will need to be in place by the date Brexit
occurs, even if this is only in the form of transitional arrange-
ments. To leave intellectual property jurisdiction unaddressed
at the point at which Britain departs the European Union would
create tremendous uncertainty, if not a degree of panic and/or
chaos, among intellectual property holders and users. The value
of intellectual property assets in Europe, and their economic im-
portance, means this would not be a positive outcome for either
the European Union or a newly independent Britain.
18. European Parliament Press Release, Red Lines on Brexit Negotiations
(Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20170329IPR69054/red-lines-on-brexit-negotiations.
19. Theresa May, British Prime Minister, Speech at Lancaster House, Lon-
don, (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-
mays-brexit-speech-full/ [hereinafter Lancaster House Speech].
20. Alex Barker &Guy Chazan, B_(/AF( 6&AJ?' &. ‘bA$.(JF OA('&T T(_HF T_>?'
L_&F(’ K_/&(_, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/937f71c2-dcd5-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce; Jennifer Rankin et al., Brexit: EU
6_Z' N. &. O(FF T(_HF T_>?' 5/&A> ‘8(.C(F''’ ./ OA/_> TF(0', GUARDIAN (Mar.
31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/31/eu-willing-to-
discuss-free-trade-deal-before-final-terms-of-brexit; Raf Casert, EU Legisla-
tors Tell UK on Brexit: No Parallel Talks, ASSOC. PRESS (Apr. 5, 2017),
http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/cae69a7523db45408eeb2b3a98c0c9c5/Arti
cle_2017-04-05-EU?Europe-Brexit/id-d8a390cc134d4ebba818594df6e794d3.
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Focusing on implications for intellectual property law and in-
terests, this article identifies jurisdictional issues that will need
to be renegotiated and restructured as Brexit approaches. The
results will influence the post-Brexit future of intellectual prop-
erty within the European Union and Britain, and questions
about substantive intellectual property arrangements21 will re-
main ambiguous until these jurisdictional issues have been re-
solved. The article remains neutral with respect to political is-
sues (such as the merits or otherwise of Brexit, and the merits
or otherwise of particular intellectual property laws or intellec-
tual property harmonization more generally), instead assessing
laws in terms of what the European Union and/or Britain have
sought to accomplish with respect to intellectual property. With-
out supporting the position of either Britain or the European
Union over the other, this article identifies strategic priorities
that should concern Brexit negotiators on both sides of the bar-
gaining table.
Part I of this article will introduce terminological issues that
affect the way in which Brexit outcomes are understood, and
against which outcomes will be assessed. Part II will then dis-
cuss general considerations that will constrain the flexibility of
Brexit negotiators with respect to intellectual property law.
These include issues such as the scope and territorial nature of
intellectual property law, the international intellectual property
framework, and jurisdictional complexity. Part III will analyze
the structure of EU intellectual property jurisdiction pre-Brexit,
marking the starting point from which negotiations must com-
mence, and it discusses doctrine-specific jurisdictional issues
that will need to be addressed. Part IV will then consider how
intergovernmental arrangements might be reorganized, thus re-
fashioning the environment in which decisions about intellec-
tual property laws can be made. For example, after leaving the
European Union, will Britain remain within the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) and/or the European Economic Area
(EEA)? If so, Brexit is less likely to have a dramatic impact on
intellectual property relations between the European Union and
Britain, or on intellectual property holders in those jurisdictions.
21. For substantive questions affecting copyright, patent, designs, trade-
marks, and other intellectual property doctrines, see generally Alexandra
George, Just Keep Calm & Carry On: The Impact of Brexit on Intellectual Prop-
erty Laws in Britain and the European Union, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. STUD. 90
(2017).
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Or will Britain go an entirely separate way? If so, a treaty will
presumably be sought to govern Britain’s post-Brexit relations
with the European Union, which would be negotiated under
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. While previous trade
agreement negotiations may hint at the sort of deal that the Eu-
ropean Union would be prepared to enter, Brexit creates novel
conditions. Whatever the ultimate resolution, the implications
for intellectual property cooperation between the European Un-
ion and Britain are likely to be significant. Finally, Part V will
provide a discussion of whether Brexit will necessarily signal a
fragmentation of intellectual property jurisdiction in Europe, or,
if Brexit could in fact lay the foundations for a new era of glob-
alization of intellectual property laws in an EU image.
I. TERMINOLOGY AND ASSESSINGOUTCOMES: A HARD OR SOFT
BREXIT?
Prior to examining the substantive issues, mention should be
made of the terminology that this article uses to describe juris-
dictional outcomes arising from Brexit. Assessments of the likely
impact of decisions to be made about Britain’s departure from
the European Union are commonly couched in the language of
“hardJclean” and “soft” BreSitK22 The hard/soft terminology, how-
ever, can be controversial,23 and the meaning of these terms can
vary depending on the contexts in which they are used.24 Some
preliminary explanation is therefore necessary.
22. For media explanations of the “soft” and “hard” BreSit terminologyO see
J.P., 1B_& A' &BF bADDF(F/JF BF&]FF/ _ “M_(H” _/H “6.D&” B(F\A&# ECONOMIST
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-ex-
plains/2016/10/economist-explains-3; Alexandra Sims, What is the Difference
Between Hard and Soft Brexit? Everything You Need to Know, INDEPENDENT
(Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-hard-soft-
what-is-the-difference-uk-eu-single-market-freedom-movement-theresa-may-
a7342591.html.
23. British Prime Minister Teresa May rejects use of this terminology alto-
getherO stating “I don’t accept the terms hard and soft BreSitK” EliRabeth PiperO
Hard Brexit is Not Inevitable, Says May, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-may-sterling-idUKKBN14T1AO.
24. Politicians and commentators sometimes use the 0hard’ and 0soft’ BreSit
terminology with related but different meanings. For example, the European
Union is both a single market and a customs union. Used in this context, a
hard Brexit would involve Britain leaving both the single market and the cus-
toms union. By contrast, a soft Brexit would occur if Britain remained within
the single market (the EEA) but not the customs union, or vice versa.
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Throughout this article, hard/soft terminology refers to the de-
gree of difference from pre-Brexit arrangements that will be
brought about by Britain’s departure from the European UnionK
Referring to the gradations of upheaval that would be caused by
different Brexit scenarios, this terminology places potential
Brexit arrangements on a spectrum from the softest to the hard-
est options.
In this context, a soft Brexit would entail little change, with
many of the pre-Brexit arrangements between Britain and the
European Union remaining in place after Brexit occurs, and lit-
tle practical difference between the pre- and post-Brexit rela-
tionship between Britain and the European Union.25 This could
be achieved, for example, by Britain leaving the European Union
but not the EEA Qdiscussed below as the “Borway 2ption”PK EuL
ropean Council26 president Zonald TuskO howeverO has stated: “I
think it is useless to speculate about 0soft BreSit’K K K K These
would be purely theoretical speculations. In my opinion, the only
real alternative to a 0hard BreSit’ is 0no BreSit’K Even if today
hardly anyone believes in such a possibilityK”27 In light of such
statements, a soft Brexit seems unlikely.
By contrast, a hard Brexit would involve a sharp break from
the arrangements in existence pre-BreSitO with Britain’s deparL
ture from the European Union causing dramatic adjustments to
25. The House of Commons Library in the British Parliament has published
a glossary of BreSit termsO in which it defines “soft BreSit” as “WaV situation in
which the UK leaves the EU but negotiates continued membership of the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA) and largely staying in the single market while
giving up influence over single market rulesK” Brexit Glossary, PARLIAMENT.UK
(Mar. 13, 2017), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBrief-
ing/Summary/CBP-7840 (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter The House of
Commons Library Glossary].
26. Under Article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion QTHEUPO the European Council establishes the EU’s political and policy
agenda. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 68, May 9, 2008, :II4 2KEK QC <<7P 85 Whereinafter THEUVK Its 0conL
clusions’ are adopted by consensus among all Member StatesO with its memL
bership consisting of the Member States’ heads of stateJgovernmentO the PresL
ident of the European Council, and the President of the European Commission.
Id.
27. Donald Tusk, European Council President, Speech at the European Pol-
icy Centre conference, SPEECH 575/16 (Oct. 13, 2016) http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/13-tusk-speech-epc/.
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its relationships with the EU Member States.28 Donald Tusk
summariRed this as the British “demand to 0take back control’K
Bamely the 0liberation’ from European =urisdictionO a 0no’ to the
freedom of movement or further contributions to the EU
budgetK”29 This seems to be the sort of Brexit that both parties
anticipated as negotiations began.
From an intellectual property perspective, a hard Brexit would
necessitate sweeping reformation of British domestic laws in re-
sponse to the loss of access to EU intellectual property registra-
tion and enforcement regimes. In due course, it would probably
also lead to British intellectual property laws diverging from the
EU standards they complied with pre-Brexit. This sort of hard
Brexit would have a significant impact on the European Union
by reducing the territory and population over which its intellec-
tual property frameworks have jurisdiction. In turn, this would
detract from the EU’s appeal to businesses and investorsK
This article examines how Brexit could play out for intellectual
property and suggests that, even if a hard Brexit is negotiated
overall, there is scope for arrangements to be put in place that
would effect a harder Brexit with respect to some areas of the
law, while allowing for a softer Brexit with respect to other areas
of the law. Even if there was a harder Brexit with respect to one
area of intellectual property law (such as copyright), there might
simultaneously be a softer Brexit with respect to other areas of
intellectual property law (such as trademarks and/or patents).
Given the environment in which discussions about post-Brexit
intellectual property jurisdiction will occur, this nuanced ap-
proach may well produce the best possible outcome for both par-
ties.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW-MAKING IN EUROPE
Negotiations between Britain and the European Union con-
cerning Brexit and beyond will be confined by international laws
that affect intellectual property law making throughout the
world. Negotiations will also begin from a base-line starting
28. See The House of Commons Library Glossary, supra note :7K A “hard
BreSit” has been defined as “WaV situation in which the UD leaves the EU
swiftly and probably with a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU. A very
hard Brexit would involve resorting to WTO rules.” Id. These options are dis-
cussed further in Part IV of this article.
29. Tusk, supra note 27.
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point of existing jurisdictional arrangements. Both of these fac-
tors exist separately from Brexit considerations, but will influ-
ence, shape, and constrain negotiations as they relate to post-
Brexit intellectual property arrangements in Britain and the
European Union. This Part will provide a broad overview of im-
portant aspects of European and international intellectual prop-
erty law that will restrict the options open to Brexit negotiators
on both sides of the table, including jurisdictional issues and the
constraints imposed by multinational treaties.
A. TBF 6J.+F .D ‘I/&F>>FJ&%_> 8(.+F(&Z’
By its very nature, intellectual property is an exceedingly com-
plex area of law. It has a long history that stretches beyond the
domestic laws of nation states, and law-making in this area has
often been entwined with considerations about international in-
fluence and trade. The legacy is a network of intellectual prop-
erty laws created over centuries and forged by decisions of states
and non-state actors alike.
Intellectual property comprises several distinct legal doc-
trines, including patents, trademarks, copyright, designs. It also
includes other laws that are equivalent in function to those often
referred to beyond Europe as sui generis laws.30 Each of these
has different rules with respect to the identification and/or grant
of property interests, the nature of the rights that attach to those
interests, and when those rights are infringed.
Since the late 1800s, the definition and development of intel-
lectual property laws have been shaped by a succession of inter-
national treaties that not only affect relations between nations,
but also impact the form intellectual property laws can take
within nation states. The conclusion of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883)31 and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
30. In EuropeO one must take care that the term 0sui generis’ laws is not
confused with 0sui generis database lawsK’ In other jurisdictions, distinct areas
of intellectual property law that do not fall within the core intellectual property
doctrines of copyright, design, patent, or trade mark law, are often referred to
as sui generis. Within Europe, however, that term has become widely associ-
ated with database protection.
31. See generally Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, March 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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(1886)32 set the scene for an international standardization of in-
tellectual property principles that has continued for well over a
hundred years.
The intrinsic nature of intellectual property and its global gov-
ernance framework will limit decisions that the European Union
and Britain will be able to make with respect to this area of law.
B. Territorial Rights
Intellectual property laws are territorially based, meaning
each sovereign state can make laws creating intellectual prop-
erty, and rights attaching to that property, which can be en-
forced within its domestic borders. As such, intellectual property
laws have traditionally been national in character, with cross-
border issues being governed by treaties and general conflict of
laws principles.
EU law created new conditions by enacting supranational in-
tellectual property laws. These are vividly exemplified by the
European Union Trade Mark system that applies throughout
the European Union, and also by pan-EU laws that permeate
copyright, patent, design, and other areas of intellectual prop-
erty.
One of the challenges for Brexit negotiators will be to preserve
the existing benefits that accrue to both the EuropeanUnion and
Britain from the latter’s participation in the former’s supranaL
tional intellectual property legal frameworks.
C. The WTO and TRIPS
Even if the European Union and Britain choose to go their sep-
arate ways through a hard Brexit approach to intellectual prop-
erty laws, and even if their laws were then to diverge through
subsequent legislative action and judicial interpretation, the
constraints of multilateral agreements should ensure that the
intellectual property laws of Britain and the European Union
remain substantially standardized post-Brexit.
The content of modern intellectual property laws continues to
be strongly determined by a series of international treaties, the
most significant of which is the World Trade 2rganiRation’s
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
32. See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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Rights Q“TRIPS Agreement”PK33 Concluded in 1994, this multilat-
eral agreement consolidated core intellectual property principles
and provided standard conceptual foundations for intellectual
property laws throughout much of the world. Covering copy-
right, designs, patents, trademarks, and some other areas of in-
tellectual property, the TRIPS Agreement elucidated base
standards of intellectual property protection that all signatories
are required to implement in their domestic laws. While the
manner in which they do so is left to individual states,34 the in-
clusion of TRIPS-consistent principles in the laws of all 164
WTO Member States has led to a high degree of standardization
of intellectual property laws worldwide.
All EU Member States are WTO members, with the European
Union being aWTOMember State in its own right. All are there-
fore obliged to adopt TRIPS-standards with respect to the mini-
mum levels of intellectual property protection provided within
their territorial boundaries. TRIPS-standards match or exceed
those of earlier intellectual property agreements, thus entrench-
ing an underlying level of standardization throughout WTO
Member States. This standardization, however, is not compre-
hensive. The international treaties demand only that minimum
standards of intellectual property protection be implemented,
leaving it to signatories to determine how best to incorporate the
principles into domestic laws. Where European states have cho-
sen to adopt higher standards than required by the treaties, or
where the standards are not prescriptive about certain aspects
of intellectual property law, diverse laws can be found across the
European Union.
D. TRIPS Plus
European jurisdictions were active in helping to shape the fi-
nal text of the TRIPS Agreement and, since that time, many EU
intellectual property laws have become “TRIPS Plus” in natureK
In other words, their provisions not only comply with TRIPS but
are more stringent than what is required by the TRIPS Agree-
ment.
33. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
34. Id. art.1(1).
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In negotiations for free trade agreements (FTAs), the Euro-
pean Union typically seeks the insertion of TRIPS Plus stand-
ards in the laws of other nations.35 As the most likely scenario is
probably that Britain and the European Union will eventually
conclude an FTA, setting out the terms on which trade will occur
between them post-Brexit, it can be expected that longer term
post-Brexit intellectual property arrangements between the two
jurisdictions would maintain existing TRIPS Plus standards,
even if practicalities and pragmatism demand that transitional
arrangements for the interim period be more administrative and
less substantive.
E. Jurisdictional Complexity
The property rights granted by intellectual property laws are
private in nature, yet the proprietor and/or the state may take
enforcement actions in various circumstances. Indeed, intellec-
tual property implicates private and public law, domestic and
international law, and criminal and civil law, resulting in a high
level of complexity. This complexity is intensified within the Eu-
ropean Union, where layers of jurisdiction overlap and some-
times operate simultaneously; where some aspects of intellec-
tual property laws are harmonized and/or uniform, but others
are not; where diverse legal traditions lead to compromises as
standards are negotiated; and where law-makers’ decisions ultiL
mately tend to have a significant influence on the development
of intellectual property law, policy, and governance worldwide.
A hard Brexit arrangement would involve disentangling Brit-
ish intellectual property law from its European Union counter-
part, requiring many businesses to register new patents, trade-
marks, and/or designs in one or other jurisdiction if they wish to
maintain existing levels of protection over their assets. Follow-
ing a hard Brexit, British intellectual property laws would likely
start to diverge from their European Union counterparts?both
in their content and their interpretation?adding complexity
and cost for those using this area of lawK By contrastO a 0soft
35. For commentary, see, e.g., KEITH MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 131 (2012); ARVIDLUKAUSKAS ET AL., HANDBOOK OFTRADEPOLICYFOR
DEVELOPMENT 559 (2013); EU BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
INTELLECTUALPROPERTY: FORBETTER ORWORSE? (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2013).
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BreSit’ outcomeO with respect to intellectual propertyO could reL
sult in arrangements that are not dissimilar from those cur-
rently in operation. This would bring the likelihood of substan-
tial continuity for users of intellectual property laws.
The British government has sought to reassure the intellectual
property community, stating:
We recognise that for EU trade marks, users will want clarity
over the long-term coverage of those rights. The government is
exploring various options and we will be consulting users of the
system about the best way forward. Even after the UK leaves
the EU, UK businesses will still be able to register an EU trade
mark, which will cover all remaining EU Member States.36
It made an almost identical statement with respect to designs.37
Uncertainty about these issues, however, seems likely to per-
sist for some time. This is partly because post-Brexit arrange-
ments between the European Union and Britain will require
years of negotiation, first, with respect to the Article 50 arrange-
ments concerning how Britain will depart from the European
Union and, second, with respect to whatever agreements are
reached to govern relations between Britain and the European
Union post-Brexit.
Adding to the uncertainty is the intricacy of the EU intellec-
tual property acquis, which means that various intellectual
property doctrines will probably need to be dealt with one-by-
one. It could, therefore, be a lengthy process before outcomes are
concluded. Uncertainty is intensified by the likelihood of a hard
Brexit, as this would result in more arrangements having to be
negotiated piecemeal than would other Brexit options. The de-
tails of post-Brexit arrangements are particularly unpredictable
in an environment in which both sides will be seeking to protect
their own interests, which may include non-intellectual property
interests, and could use intellectual property as a bargaining
chip to trade against other assets.
III. BREXIT’S EFFECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEANUNION
Whether hard, soft, or somewhere in between, Brexit will bring
about jurisdictional modifications that will affect, perhaps quite
36. IP and Brexit: The Facts, GOV.UK (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ip-and-brexit-the-facts.
37. Id.
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significantly, intellectual property arrangements in Britain and
the European Union. This Part will survey the pre-Brexit juris-
dictional arrangements that will form the starting point for ne-
gotiations, including the existing intellectual property frame-
work within the European Union. It will also identify areas of
those arrangements that can be expected to change.
A. The Development of the European Union
While intellectual property has not always been one of the Eu-
ropean Union’s priority policy areasO the European Union’s
founding (_A'./ H’[&(F helps to explain why intellectual property
became so important to the growth of the organization that Brit-
ain has decided to leave. It also helps to explain why, even de-
spite pre-negotiation rhetoric that might suggest otherwise, self-
interest may encourage the EuropeanUnion to work to maintain
a tight or soft(er) Brexit arrangement with Britain around intel-
lectual property law.38
Following the destruction experienced by Europe duringWorld
War II, a 1950 landmark speech by French foreign minister Rob-
ert Schuman, known as the Schuman Declaration, set out a vi-
sion for a peaceful and united continent characterized by eco-
nomic integration.39 Schuman proposed that:
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately
provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic
development as a first step in the federation of Europe. . . . The
solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that
any war between France and Germany becomes not merely un-
thinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this
powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take
part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries
with the basic elements of industrial production on the same
38. See, e.g., Ben Chapman, Brexit: Britain Must be Made Worse-Off After
Leaving EU, Says Austrian Chancellor, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-britain-must-be-
made-worse-off-after-leaving-eu-says-austrian-chancellor-christian-kern-
a7578206.html; Ashley Cowburn, Brexit: UK Must Not be Better Off Outside
EU, Warns French Senate Report, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.in-
dependent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-britain-must-not-be-better-off-out-
side-eu-says-french-senate-report-a7582886.html.
39. The Schuman Declaration, EUR. UNION (May 9, 1950), https://eu-
ropa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declara-
tion_en (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Schuman Declaration].
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terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unifica-
tion.40
Two years later, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg formed the European Coal and
Steel Community, laying the foundations for what would even-
tually become the European Union. In 1957, the same nations
formed the European Economic Community (EEC) and, follow-
ing 0enlargement’ through the accession of other European naL
tions?including Britain in 1973?the European Union was
formed on November 1, 1993.41 The foundations were in place for
harmonization of European laws.
Throughout the post-war period, intellectual property re-
mained largely a matter of domestic law in European nations.
While international treaties brought about a degree of standard-
ization of intellectual property concepts and laid out principles
for cross-jurisdictional treatment of intellectual property,42 in-
tellectual property was not part of European integration agree-
ments at this stage. It is unsurprising, however, that for an or-
ganization committed to fostering economic cooperation and in-
terdependence, intellectual property would soon become a valu-
able mechanism for achieving these ends.
B. Legislative Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Law
The EU’s originating treaties in the early <33Is did not menL
tion intellectual property,43 and this area of law continued to re-
main within the domestic jurisdictions of EUMember States. As
40. Id.
41. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C
191/1 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
42. Most notable among these were the aforementioned Paris Convention
and Berne Convention. Paris Convention, supra note 31; Berne Convention,
supra note 32. For well over a century, these two conventions helped to shape
the nature of intellectual property laws in Europe and internationally. Both
found their genesis in a nineteenth centuryWestern Europe, which was fearful
of international piracy and counterfeiting. As a result, both set out minimum
standards of intellectual property protection required to be afforded in the laws
of signatory states. Post-Brexit, both the European Union and Britain will re-
main Member States of these conventions and the TRIPS Agreement, ensuring
an ongoing degree of standardization of intellectual property laws, regardless
of what EU?Britain arrangements are concluded during the negotiation pe-
riod.
43. Guy Tritton & Richard Davis, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 31, ¶
1@40 (2nd ed. 2002).
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it became clear, however, that intellectual property matters
were important to the functioning of a common market, and in-
tellectual property matters came before the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) in relation to other areas of EU
law,44 intellectual property law was incorporated into EU juris-
prudence.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union45
(TFEU) now specifies:
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the in-
ternal market, the European Parliament and the Council, act-
ing in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall
establish measures for the creation of European intellectual
property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual
property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of
centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and super-
vision arrangements.46
On this basis, the European Union has explicit power to legis-
late in the area of intellectual property. EUMember States must
therefore comply with and harmonize their domestic laws by ref-
erence to a series of laws, known as Regulations and Directives,
with respect to intellectual property law.
In practice, this means that Member States are required to im-
plement domestic legislation to achieve the objectives set out in
the Directives. While states are given flexibility as to how they
will achieve those ob=ectives Qhence 0harmoniRation’ rather than
0uniformity’ in the lawsPO Zirectives are binding as to the result
to be achieved and the timetable in which this should occur.
In addition to the Directives, the Council has promulgated a
large collection of Regulations with respect to intellectual prop-
ertyK Regulations have 0general applicationO’ meaning they be-
come legally enforceable in all Member States upon commence-
ment, and they override any inconsistent national law that pre-
viously existed. Areas of intellectual property law that are dealt
with in Regulations have become relatively well-harmonized,
but their application in Britain is likely to be directly impacted
by Brexit.
44. See, e.g., Case C-56/64 & C-58/64, Établissements Consten SARL and
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Commu-
nity, 1968 E.C.R. 299.
45. TFEU, supra note 26, art. 118.
46. Id.
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The body of harmonized EU law became known as the acquis
communautaire or Community acquis. In the area of intellectual
property law, this acquis contains Directives with respect to cop-
yright, designs, patents, and trademarks, as well as related
fields such as plant varieties, geographical indications, semicon-
ductor topographies, and the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty laws.
Following Brexit, EU Directives and Regulations will no
longer apply directly in Britain. The British Parliament will
have the freedom to determine whether domestic law replicates
EU law and, if so, to what degree. To this end, Theresa May has
announced a 0Great Repeal BillO’ which is planned to come into
force on the date of Britain’s eSit from the European UnionK At
that point, it would repeal the instrument by which Britain
joined the European Union47 and end the supremacy of EU law
in Britain. It would also transpose existing EU law into British
legislation, which the government could then amend, repeal, or
improve on a case-by-case basis.48
The delegated powers provisions of the Great Repeal Bill49 will
be important in the context of intellectual property laws that,
pre-Brexit, are entwined with EU law through the direct appli-
cation of Regulations. The Great Repeal Bill White Paper does
not refer specifically to intellectual property laws and it is thus
far unclear how Britain intends to transpose and/or amend laws
referring to EU institutions, such as the European Union Intel-
lectual Property Office (EUIPO). To avoid widespread confusion
and disruption, this is a matter that will need to be settled prior
to the date Brexit takes effect.
C. Administration & Determination of Intellectual Property
Matters
Registration of intellectual property under EU law, and inter-
pretation of the EU’s legislation and findings on its applicationO
are made by a variety of decision-making authorities. Post-
47. See generally European Communities Act 1972, c. 68 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/68/contents.
48. Policy Paper of the Dept. for Exiting the European Union on Legislating
D.( &BF 5/A&FH KA/CH.0’' 1A&BH(_]_> D(.0 &BF P%(.+F_/ 5/A./, 13@18, (Mar.
30, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/604516/Great_repeal_bill_white_paper_accessible.pdf [herein-
after Great Repeal Bill White Paper].
49. Id. at 19@25.
150 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:1
Brexit, jurisdiction over some matters currently dealt with by
EU institutions will devolve to British institutions.
1. General Courts
The EU’s court structureO or CJEU, comprises the General
Court (known until December 1, 2009 as the Court of First In-
stance or CHIPO the European 0Court of Eustice’ QECEPO and the
Civil Service Tribunal. The ECJ is the highest court with respect
to EU law, and the decisions of its twenty-eight judges, assisted
by eleven independent Advocates-General who present inde-
pendent legal opinions on matters before the Court, have signif-
icantly influenced the harmonization of intellectual property
laws throughout Europe.
In addition, national courts may make references for prelimi-
narily rulings from the ECJ to guide them in the determination
of a dispute in the domestic jurisdiction. This process aids the
harmonization project by increasing consistency in the applica-
tion of intellectual property law across European states.
After leaving the European Union, Britain will no longer be
subject to decisions of the CJEU, and the highest British court
of appeal will be the Supreme Court of the UnitedDingdom Q“SuL
preme Court”PK50 Historic decisions of the CJEU that apply on
the date of Brexit will attract the same precedent status as deci-
sions of the Supreme Court,51 and the letter of EU-influenced
statutory law in Britain may persist unchanged for some time
after Brexit. Britain could even decide to maintain intellectual
property legislation that is harmonized with EU intellectual
property laws. In practice, judicial rulings will probably lead to
diverse interpretations in different jurisdictions, disparities will
probably emerge between British and EU applications of intel-
lectual property laws, and British and EU intellectual property
law may start to diverge on particular points. This is more likely
to occur due to differences of approach between the English com-
mon law tradition and the Continental civil law tradition.
While Britain could decide to soften its exit from the European
Union with respect to intellectual property by replicating EU
50. In Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary would be the highest court of
appeal for criminal matters. About the High Court, SCOTTISH COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS, https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/the-courts/supreme-courts/high-
court/about-the-high-court (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
51. Great Repeal Bill White Paper, supra note 48, ¶¶ 2.12@2.17.
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legislation and continuing to follow EU case law after Brexit,
whether or not as part of the negotiated settlement with the Eu-
ropean Union, this seems unlikely for at least two reasons. First,
it would leave British courts bound to passively follow the deci-
sions of a legal system in which it no longer had input. Second,
such an approach would seem to fly in the face of one of the key
justifications for leaving the European Union in the first place,
which is a desire to regain jurisdictional autonomy.52 Supporting
this conclusion, the Great Repeal Bill White Paper hints at no
appetite for such an approach.53
Beyond the general courts, several other bodiesmake decisions
with respect to intellectual property law in the European Union.
2. EUIPO?Trademarks and Designs
The EUIPO, which was, until March 26, 2016, known as the
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM), is lo-
cated in Alicante, Spain. It is responsible for registering Euro-
pean Union TradeMarks (EUTMs)54 and Registered Community
52. See, e.g., Why Vote Leave, WHY VOTE LEAVE, http://www.voteleavetake-
control.org/why_vote_leave.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 2n its “Why .ote
Ceave” page the Why .ote Ceave campaign statesO “WwVe can make our own
laws; Our laws should be made by people we can elect and kick out?that’s
more democraticK” Id. This would also fly in the face of commitments British
Prime Minister May made in a keynote speech to the Conservative Party Con-
ference on 2ctober 7O :I<6O where she set out her “vision for Britain after
BreSitK” Theresa MayO British Prime MinisterO Speech at Tory Conference (Oct.
5, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-
tory-conference-2016-in-full-transcript-a7346171.html [hereinafter Vote
Ceave Campaign SpeechVK May statedO “let’s be clear about what is going to
happen. . . . Our laws made not in Brussels but in Westminster. Our judges
sitting not in Luxembourg but in courts across the land. The authority of EU
law in this country ended forever. The people told us they wanted these
things?and this Conservative Government is going to deliver themK” Id.
53. Great Repeal Bill White Paper, supra note 48.
54. Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to
Trade Marks 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 [hereinafter Trademark Directive]. This re-
pealed Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC to approximate the laws of the Mem-
ber States relating to trade marks. See also Council Regulation 207/2009 of 26
February 2009 on the Community TradeMark (CTMR) 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC).
Until March 23, 2016, EUTMs were called Community Trade Marks or CTMs.
The name was amended by the EU Trade Mark Regulation. See Council Regu-
lation 2015/2424 O.J. (L 341) 21 (EU).
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Designs (RCDs).55 These both provide for unitary rights with ef-
fect throughout the European Union, which are enforceable in
domestic courts.
Trademark and design registration decisions made by EUIPO
eSaminers can be appealed internally to EUIP2’s Boards of ApL
peal. Its decisions can be appealed to the General Court, and in
turn to the ECJ.
A hard Brexit would result in the EUIPO no longer registering
trademarks or designs with application in Britain. Britain, in
turnO would no longer be bound by decisions of EUIP2’s Boards
of Appeal or the ECJ.
Subject to agreement by Britain and the European Union, a
softer Brexit may keep Britain within the EUIPO, in which case
EUIPO registrations and decisions of the Boards of Appeal could
remain applicable in Britain post-Brexit. While this would re-
quire changes to the EU laws constituting the EUIPO, it may be
attractive to the European Union, as the EUIPO not only pro-
vides a relatively simple and cost-effective way of obtaining
rights with effect throughout the European Union, but it is also
a more useful system to intellectual property holders if its juris-
diction eStends over Britain’s large marketK
The effect of such an arrangement, however, would be that
trademarks and designs governed by EU law and under the ju-
risdiction of the ECJ would continue to apply in Britain. British
courts would then presumably need to make judgments about
EUTMs and RCDs in accordance with EU law. On the one hand,
this might be considered acceptable despite Brexit, as rights-
holders would choose to opt into the system, thus placing them-
selves under the jurisdiction of EU law for this limited purpose.
On the other hand, this outcome might be unacceptable to those
in Britain seeking independence from EU law through Brexit,
especially as respondents in EUTM and RCD cases would find
themselves under the jurisdiction of EU law regardless of their
preferences, an outcome which would seem directly contrary to
what Brexit is designed to achieve.
55. Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
October 1998 on the Legal Protection of Designs 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28 [herein-
after Design Directive]; European Council Regulation 6/2002 of 12 December
2001 on Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC). [hereinafter Design Reg-
ulation].
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Britain’s Chartered Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys
(CITMA) has mapped out multiple scenarios as to how regis-
tered EU rights could be protected post-Brexit.
With respect to trademarks, CITMA has proposed seven op-
tions.56 These are: a 0UD Plus’ modelO in which the EUTM system
is extended to cover all EU countries plus Britain, (and possibly
other jurisdictions, such as countries such as Norway, Switzer-
landO and EU candidate countriesP% a 0Eersey’ model in which
Britain treats EUTMs as though they automatically apply to
British territory% a 0Montenegro’ model in which Britain would
automatically enter all EUTMs onto its domestic register as na-
tional registered trademarks, with the same registration date
and scope of protection as the corresponding EUTM held, and
also the same priority and seniority if relevant% a 0Tuvalu’ model
that would operate like the Montenegro model, except that
EUTM rights-holders would have to make a positive choice to
extend their rights to Britain (e.g., by completing a form by a
certain dateP% a 0veto’ option that would operate like the Tuvalu
model, but the British Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO)
would retain a right to veto the transfer of registrations to na-
tional trademarks (e.g., if the UKIPO had previously refused a
registration for this mark, or if the mark was not otherwise reg-
istrable in Britain under absolute groundsP% the 0Republic of IreL
land’ option in which holders of EUTMs are given the option of
having their rights placed on the British register as national reg-
istered trademarks at the time of renewal or up until a particu-
lar cut-off date, with EUTMs continuing to protect the designs
in Britain during the interim period% and a 0conversion’ model in
which EUTMs could be converted into British national trade-
marks while retaining their EUTM application date and contin-
uing to exist as EUTMs, but where registration in Britain would
be dependent on passing a full examination by the UKIPO.57
CITMA concludes: “Each scenario has particular strengths and
weaknessesK Hor eSampleO the 0EU plus’ scenario has many benL
efits, but its key weakness is that it would require the agreement
56. EU Registered Rights—Trade Marks, CITMA (Aug. 19, 2016),
https://www.citma.org.uk/membership/eu_resources/eu_brexit/eu_regis-
tered_rights_-_trade_marks. This document was expanded upon in a further
document: Tuvalu and Montenegro Scenarios, CITMA (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.citma.org.uk/membership/eu_resources/eu_brexit/eu_regis-
tered_rights_-_trade_marks_-_depth.
57. Id.
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of the EU/EUIPO, whereas the other scenarios could be adopted
unilaterally by the UDK”58
With respect to designs, novelty requirements would normally
prevent the registration in Britain of a previously registered de-
sign.59 If lack of novelty would prevent registration of national
designs in Britain by RCD holders, other transitional arrange-
ments may be necessary to allow equivalent British domestic
rights to be obtained. CITMA has proposed six options.60 These
are: a 0UD Plus’ modelO in which the RCZ system is converted
into a European design system that covers both the EU and Brit-
ain% a 0Eersey’ model in which Britain treats RCZs as though
they apply to British territory% a 0Montenegro’ model in which
Britain would automatically enter all RCDs onto its domestic
register as national registered designs, with the same registra-
tion date and scope of protection as the corresponding RCD held;
a 0Tuvalu’ model that would operate like the Montenegro modelO
except that RCD rights-holders would have to make a positive
choice to extend their rights to Britain (e.g., by completing a
form by a certain dateP% a 0veto’ option in which RCZ rights-hold-
ers can choose to have their rights placed on the British register
as national registered designs, but the UKIPO retains a right of
veto% and the 0Ireland’ option in which RCZ rights-holders are
given the opportunity to have their rights placed on the British
58. EU Registered Rights—Trade Marks, supra note 56.
59. Exceptions to this principle apply for Paris Convention applications. Ar-
ticle 4(A)(1) states:
Any person who has duly filed an application for . . . an in-
dustrial design . . . in one of the countries of the Union, or his
successor in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the
other countries, a right of priority during the periods herein-
after fixed.
Paris Convention, supra note 9<O artK 8QAPQ<PK ArtK8QCPQ<P states: “The periods
of priority referred to above shall be K K K siSmonths for industrial designsK K K K”
Id. art. 4(C)(1).
60. EU Registered Rights—Designs, CITMA (Aug. 19, 2016),
https://www.citma.org.uk/membership/eu_resources/eu_brexit/eu_regis-
tered_rights_-_designs. This document was expanded upon. See Tuvalu and
Montenegro Scenarios, CITMA (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.citma.org.uk/mem-
bership/eu_resources/eu_brexit/eu_registered_rights_-_designs_-_depth.
2017] Intellectual Property Post-Brexit 155
register as national registered designs when they are due for re-
newal, with RCDs continuing to protect the designs in Britain
during the interim period.61
Ultimately, if considered independently of non-intellectual
property issues that will be negotiated due to Brexit, decisions
about the future of Britain within the EUIPO framework and/or
the future of EUIPO-registered rights in Britain are likely to de-
pend on pragmatic decisions about political costs and what is
likely to produce the best outcome for the British and EU econo-
mies. If Britain leaves the European Union before these issues
have been finalized, it will be important that transitional ar-
rangements are put in place to cover any period between Brexit
and the conclusion of an FTA (or other agreement addressing
intellectual property issues) between Britain and the European
Union. A precedent for transitional provisions was created after
Ireland separated from Britain in 1921 and established its own
intellectual property laws in 1927.62 Even if it means acting uni-
laterally to avoid interim problems, it is recommended that Brit-
ain should implement a similar system following Brexit to, at
least, recognize priority dates for existing EU registrations. It
should arguably also, either, apply EU registrations directly
within Britain, or allow a transitional period within which EU
rights holders could apply for conversion of their interests to na-
tional British rights ormake a national application based on ear-
lier EU registrations.
3. EPO & UPC?Patents
The European Patent Office (EPO) is an administrative office
within the intergovernmental European Patent Organisation,
whose jurisdiction stems from the European Patent Convention
(EPC).63 A centralized European patent application can be made
to the EPO, nominating any, some, or all of the thirty-eight sig-
natory states in which the applicant seeks registration. If
grantedO the registration is issued as a “bundle of nationally en-
forceable patents” in all relevant signatory statesK All twenty-
61. Id.
62. Industrial and Commercial Property (Protection) Act (Act No. 16/1927)
(Ir.).
63. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Con-
vention) of 5 October 1973, at 656, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/epc.html.
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eight EU Member States are signatories to the EPC, but mem-
bership is not exclusive to EUMember States. For example, Tur-
key and Albania are both EPO members but are not (yet) part of
the European Union. Britain could likewise remain within the
EPO framework despite Brexit.
Registration decisions of examiners at the EPO can be ap-
pealed internally to its Boards of Appeal. The EPO is independ-
ent of the European Union, meaning its registration decisions
are final and appeals cannot be made to EU courts. This should
largely insulate existing patent arrangements from Brexit re-
percussions. As grants by the EPO create national patents, in-
fringement proceedings are litigated in national courts. Post-
Brexit, the EPO will continue to be able to grant British patents
that are enforceable through British courts, and national pa-
tents that are enforceable by the domestic courts of remaining
EU Member States.
A curious situation will exist with respect to the new Unitary
Patent and Unified Patent Court, which are collectively known
as the Unitary Patent system. These are due to come into effect
in early 2018,64 prior to Brexit, with Britain as a member state.
Indeed, British ratification of the UPC Agreement65 is necessary
64. At the time of writing, the UPC website predicts the UPC will commence
in “early :I<4K” Final Preparatory Committee Signals State of Readiness,
UNIFIED PATENTCT. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.unified-patent-
court.org/faq/entry-force-and-preparatory-work.
65. European Council Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 2013/C, 2013
O.J. C 175/01, 28. [hereinafter UPC Agreement].
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for the system to commence.66 Britain has signaled its intent to
ratify this agreement, despite having triggered Article 50.67
Once the Unitary Patent system becomes operational, the EPO
will assume responsibility for registering 0European patents
with unitary effect’ QEPUEs or Unitary PatentsP throughout all
signatory jurisdictions of the UPC Agreement. Initially, this will
66. Id. Under the UPC Agreement, the system will come into force on the
first day of the fourth month after the UPC Agreement has been signed and
ratified by thirteen Member States (including France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom), and amendments to the Brussels I Regulation to accommo-
date the UPC have come into effect. Id. art. 89(1). While official documentation
is not available at the time of writing, legal media reports that a constitutional
challenge to UPC ratification was made to the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht or BVerfG) by Düsseldorf attorney Dr
Ingve Stjerna in May 2017. This case (No. 2 BvR 739/17) may put ratification
of the UPC by Germany in question. See, e.g., Complainant Against UPC Rat-
ification in Germany Confirmed as Ingve Stjerna, IPKAT (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/09/update-complainant-against-upc.html.
The UPC Chair, Alexander Ramsay, has issued a statement that:
Under the current circumstances it is difficult to maintain a
definitive starting date for the period of provisional applica-
tion. However, I am hopeful the situation regarding the con-
stitutional complaint in Germany will be resolved rather
quickly and therefore I am hopeful that the period of provi-
sional application can start during the autumn 2017 which
would mean that the sunrise period for the opt out procedure
would start early 2018 followed by the entry into force of the
UPCA and the UPC becoming operational.
A Message from the Chairman, Alexander Ramsay—June 2017, UNIFIED
PATENT CT. (June 27, 2017), https://www.unified-patent-court.org/news/mes-
sage-chairman-alexander-ramsay-june-2017.
67. EPO President Welcomes UK Decision to Ratify UPC Agreement, EUR.
PATENT OFF. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.epo.org/news- is-
sues/news/2016/20161129.html. One view is that this decision signals an in-
tention by Britain to pursue a soft Brexit, at least with respect to patent law:
Luke McDonagh, 5K A' MF_HA/C D.( ‘6.D&’ B(F\A&—Support for New EU patent
Court Proves It, CONVERSATION (Nov. 29, 2016), https://theconversa-
tion.com/uk-is-heading-for-soft-brexit-support-for-new-eu-patent-court-
proves-it-69574.
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extend to all EUMember States68 except Croatia,69 Poland,70 and
Spain.71 As with existing EPC applications, the EPO will apply
EPC rules and procedures when assessing patentability and va-
lidity standards for Unitary Patent applications.
Meanwhile, the Unified Patent Court will have specialized pa-
tent jurisdiction in all signatory states of the UPC Agreement,
and it is planned that the life sciences seat of the UPC will be in
London. Britain has keenly supported the establishment of the
UPC, which is intended to simplify and reduce the costs associ-
ated with patent litigation. Instead of patent disputes needing
to be litigated separately in the domestic courts of each Member
State in which they arise, litigation concerning affected Euro-
pean patents can be heard in a single case before the UPC. As
patent filing statistics place the EPO and the UKIPO among the
top receiving offices worldwide for patent applications,72 it
stands to reason that the UPC will be more attractive to, and
useful for, patent holders if Britain remains part of the system.
68. For an explanation of why only EU Member States are involved in the
UPC, see Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No. 17/11
(Mar. 8, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-
03/cp110017en.pdf (discussing ECJ Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011, which ruled
that an earlier plan to create a 0European Patents Court’ involving other EPC
members was incompatible with EU law). See also Opinion 1/91 of the Court,
1991 E.C.R. I-6084; Opinion 1/00 of the Court, 2002 E.C.R. I-3493.
69. Croatia was not a signatory to the UPC Agreement because it joined the
European Union after work towards the Unitary Patent and UPC was already
well underway.
70. Poland adopted a “wait and see” approach to the Unitary Patent and
UPC.Will Poland Join the Unitary Patent System?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV.
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.worldipreview.com/news/will-poland-join-the-uni-
tary-patent-system.
71. Spain opposed the Unitary Patent package and challenged the two uni-
tary patent regulations proceedings before the CJEU. Opinion of Advocate
General Bot, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of European Union, Case C-147/13,
2014 E.C.R. 1; Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union, Case C-
146/13, 2015 E.C.R. 2. These applications were lodged in late 2013 and dis-
missed on May 5, 2015. Id.
72. WIPO Facts and Figures 2016, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 11 (2016),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_943_2016.pdf (showing the
EPO as the fifth largest recipient of patent applications worldwide, accounting
for 5.5 percent of all applications); Patent Cooperation Treaty Yearly Review:
The International Patent System, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 26 (2016),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_901_2016.pdf (showing the
EPO as the third largest recipient of PCT filings, and the UKIPO as the sev-
enth largest recipient of PCT filings).
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Will users, however, rely on the Unitary Patent System for pa-
tent protection in Britain when Britain’s continuing memberL
ship of the UPC remains in doubt?
It is uncertain whether Britain will remain a member of the
UPC post-Brexit. In a House of Commons General Committee
Debate concerning the Unitary Patent and UPC, which occurred
several months prior to the Brexit referendum, the Minister for
Culture and the Digital Economy, Edward Vaizey, explained
that after a vote to BreSitO “it would be a decision for the UK
Government whether they wanted to rejoin the European patent
court. Of course, wewould have to rely on our European partners
to decide whether the UD could be a memberK”73 As the Unitary
Patent and UPC obviously have greater reach if they extend to
Britain, it seems likely that other UPC Agreement signatories
would probably want to allow Britain to remain in the system. If
so, whether or not Britain remains in the Unitary Patent and
UPC is likely to depend on whether Britain is prepared to have
this area of patent law governed by EU law post-Brexit, and
whether amendments to the system’s establishing instruments
can be settled to allow membership by a non-EU Member State.
The UPC is being established by international agreement74
and, in this respect, it is independent of the CJEU. The UPC,
however, will apply EU law75 and make preliminary references
to the CJEU, whose decisions will be binding on the UPC.76
73. House of Commons General Committee, Draft Patents (European Pa-
tent with Unitary Effect and Unified Patent Court) Order 2016, at 7,
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmgen-
eral/deleg4/160301/160301s01.htm.
74. UPC Agreement, supra note 65. For implementation in the EU, see
Council Regulation No. 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area
of the creation of unitary patent protection 2012 O.J. L 361) 1@8, and Council
Regulation (EU) No. 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard
to the applicable translation arrangements 2012 O.J. L 361) 89@92.
75. UPC Agreement, supra note 67O artK :IK Article :I states that: “The
Court shall apply Union law in its entirety and shall respect its primacyK” Id.
76. UPC Agreement, supra note 65, art. 21. Article 21 states that:
As a court common to the Contracting Member States and as
part of their judicial system, the Court shall cooperate with
the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure the cor-
rect application and uniform interpretation of Union law, as
any national court, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU in
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On one view,77 it would therefore be contradictory for Britain,
which has insisted that an important reason for Brexit is sover-
eignty over national laws, to remain part of the UPC post-Brexit.
Unitary Patent applicants would be opting into the system and
would therefore choose to be governed by the law of the Euro-
pean Union in their patent applications. If they were to appeal
to the UPC on matters of registerability and/or opposition, they
would similarly be opting into the system and would be choosing
to be governed by the law of the European Union. Infringement
cases, however, would be more problematic. As discussed above
with respect to EUTMs and RCDs, the possibility that, regard-
less of their preferences, respondents in Unitary Patent infringe-
ment cases before the UPC would find themselves governed by
EU patent laws post-Brexit, might be unacceptable to those in
Britain seeking independence from EU law.
An alternative view78 is that Britain would be ceding jurisdic-
tion over some patents to the UPC, which is an international
court existing outside the EU (albeit a court applying EU law),
not to the European Union. Ceding jurisdiction to an interna-
tional court would not be unprecedented, as Britain has already
done so with respect to the United Bation’s International Court
of Justice,79 the International Criminal Court,80 and the WT2’s
Appellate Body.81 On this view, there would be no inconsistency
between membership of the UPC and the stated Brexit position
of removing CJEU jurisdiction in Britain, as the CJEU would
not have jurisdiction over the UPC.
Several commentators have suggested ways in which Britain’s
ongoing participation in the UPC could be organized post-
particular. Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Union shall be binding on the Court.
Id.
77. Paul Kavanagh et. al., UK to Submit to Primacy of EU Law? . . .Maybe
for Patents, DECHERTLLP (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=70c764c8-2b7f-4bc9-abb0-aba596481227.
78. See Darren Smyth, The UPC After Brexit—is CJEU Jurisdiction a Deal-
Breaker?, IPKAT (Apr. 4, 2017), http://ipkitten.blogspot.nl/2017/04/the-upc-af-
ter-brexit-is-cjeu.html.
79. U.N. Charter arts. 92@96.
80. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
81. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
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Brexit.82 In essence, these approaches would require variations
of an approach involving amendments of the UPC Agreement,
as well as the conclusion of a separate agreement between Brit-
ain and the participating states of the EPC that would extend
the unitary effect of a Unitary Patent to Britain. As this agree-
ment would be governed by international law,83 Britain would
remain removed from EU law, even though that law would be
applied with respect to the Unitary Patent.
It is conceivable that Britain could find itself excluded from
the UPC if Brexit occurs before a post-Brexit arrangement with
respect to the Unitary Patent and UPC has been concluded. If
so, and if Britain wants Unitary Patents to continue to be en-
forceable in its territory in the immediate aftermath of Brexit,
establishing a recognition system for UPC judgments may pro-
vide an interim solution when cases have been heard before one
of the UPC’s European seatsK It may also be possible to have
UPC judgments enforced in British courts through ongoing post-
BreSit adoption in Britain of the EU’s Brussels Regime concernL
ing recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters,84 or through general private international law
82. See, e.g., Ansgar Ohly, Chair of Civil Law, Intellectual Property and
Competition Law at LMU Munich, Presentation at the European Patent
Judges Forum: UPC and the impact of Brexit @Way forward? (Nov. 28, 2016).
Richard Gordon QC & Tom Pascoe, Opinion: RF &BF PDDFJ& .D ‘B(F\A&’ ./ &BF
Unitary Patent Regulation and the Unified Patent Court Agreement,
CHARTERED INST. PATENT ATT’YS (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://www.cipa.org.uk/EasySiteWeb/GatewayLink.aspx?alId=10869 (an anal-
ysis by British barristers, instructed by the IP Federation, CITMA and the In-
tellectual Property Lawyers Association); Winfried Tilmann, The Future of the
UPC After Brexit, HOGAN LOVELLS,http://www.theunitarypatent.com/the-
unitary-patent-regulation-and-upc-agreement-after-brexit (last visited Apr.
20, 2017); Wouter Pors, The Unified Patent Court E Back on Track Again, BIRD
& BIRD (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/arti-
cles/2016/global/unified-patent-court-back-on-track-again; John Pegram, UK
and UPC: A Test of Compatibility, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.worldipreview.com/contributed-article/uk-and-upc-a-test-of-com-
patibility.
83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
84. While it remains in the European Union, Britain is bound by the Brus-
sels Regime on the recognition and enforcement of judgments. See Council Reg-
ulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
(EC), recast by Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of December 12, 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
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principles. This would, however, leave a gap with respect to dis-
putes over Unitary Patent infringements within British terri-
tory.
Under the long-established common law Moçambique rule,85
English courts have traditionally placed self-imposed limits on
subject-matter jurisdiction over title to or possession of foreign
immovables. This has been interpreted as including patents,
which are statutory creations of foreign governments.86 It could,
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Following Brexit,
Britain will cease to be part of this Brussels I Recast Regulation. The Great
Repeal Bill could incorporate the Brussels I Recast Regulation into British do-
mestic law, allowing continuity of the Brussels System within Britain (though,
without any further agreement, there would be no obligation on the European
Union to reciprocate). Otherwise, general conflict of laws principles concerning
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments will apply.
85. British South Africa Co v. Companhia de Moçambique HL [1893] AC
602, 622.
86. In Potter vK Broken FillO the Figh Court of Australia eStended the 0act
of state doctrine’ to foreign patents. Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1906) 3
CLR 479, 498@89 (Austl.). According to this principle, adopted from the classic
statement made by Fuller CJ in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the Courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of an-
other done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). In Lucasfilm Limited and
others (Appellants) v. Ainsworth, the Supreme Court stated:
Consequently the effect of the decision in Potter v Broken Hill
Pty Co Ltd was to apply theMoçambique rule and, especially,
the act of state doctrine to actions for patent infringement. It
received no attention in the English case-law until it was
mentioned by LordWilberforce inHesperides Hotels Ltd v Ae-
gean Turkish Holidays Ltd [1979] AC 508, 536 as authority
for the proposition that theMoçambique rule applied in Aus-
tralia. It was only from the 1980s that it came to be regarded
as a significant authority in the field of transnational intel-
lectual property litigation: Def Lepp Music v Stuart-Brown
[1986] RPC 273; Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle
[1991] Ch 75 (both copyright cases).
Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth [2012] 1 A.C. 208 (UK).
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however, be argued that the principle should be distinguished
with respect to Unitary Patents.
In the relatively recent case of Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth,87 the
Supreme Court identified a distinction between registrability
and infringement of intellectual property rights, concluding that
there is no bar to English courts accepting jurisdiction to hear
cases alleging infringement.88 That case involved copyright, and
the Supreme Court specifically noted that it “is possible to see
how the rationale of the Moçambique rule can be applied to pa-
tentsO at any rate where 'uestions of validity are involvedK”89
Nonetheless, analogies between copyright and Unitary Patents,
as well as concomitant distinctions between national patents
and Unitary Patents, could arguably be drawn in at least two
ways, each of which could extend the reasoning in Lucasfilm to
the Unitary Patent, and allow British courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion in Unitary Patent infringement cases.
First, cases involving national patents could be distinguished
from Unitary Patents on the grounds that the territorially lim-
ited nature of national patents has traditionally meant that en-
forcement of foreign patents in Britain is an issue that would not
87. Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth, [2012] 1 A.C. 208 (UK).
88. Id. [106]. The court stated:
All that is left of the Moçambique rule (except to the extent
that it is modified by the Brussels I Regulation) is that there
is no jurisdiction in proceedings for infringement of rights in
foreign land where the proceedings are 0principally concerned
with a question of the title, or the right to possession, of that
property. . . . [I]t is very difficult to see how it could apply to
copyright.
Id. [106]@[107].
89. Id. [107]. The court stated:
The basis for what remains of the rule was said by the House
of Lords in the Moçambique case to be that controversies
should be decided in the country of the situs of the property
because the right of granting it was vested in 0the ruler of the
country’ and in the Hesperides case to be the maintenance of
comity and the avoidance of conflict with foreign jurisdic-
tions. It is possible to see how the rationale of the
Moçambique rule can be applied to patents, at any rate where
questions of validity are involved.
Id.
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likely have arisen.90 By contrast, Unitary Patents cover British
territory, as well as foreign territory. It is therefore arguable
that the Lucasfilm principle distinguishing the Moçambique
rule would allow English courts to hear cases involving infringe-
ments of Unitary Patents occurring in Britain. If so, English
courts could exercise jurisdiction in Unitary Patent infringe-
ment cases post-Brexit, and this would raise no inconsistency
with BreSit’s goal of independence from EU law and the =urisdicL
tion of the CJEU.
Second, there may be scope for British courts to treat Unitary
Patents differently from the domestic patents of other nations,
on the grounds that the former were created under an interna-
tional agreement to which Britain was a party, whereas the lat-
ter are the legal creations of sovereign foreign governments. In
this sense, Unitary Patents are perhaps more akin to copyright,
which, when recognized to subsist in a member state of interna-
tional treaties such as the Berne Convention91 and the Universal
Copyright Convention,92 can be enforced in other Member States
of those treaties according to a principle known as 0national
treatmentK’ That international treaties establish the property
rights associated with both Unitary Patents and foreign copy-
right underpins this analogy. The comparison is perhaps imper-
fect because, in copyright cases, national treatment means
courts apply domestic laws when hearing cases alleging infringe-
ment within their jurisdiction. By contrast, British courts would
apply EU law in cases alleging infringement within Britain of
Unitary Patents. Nevertheless, this should not make a material
difference to the question of whether Unitary Patents can be dis-
tinguished from domestic patents, and whether British courts
would therefore be likely to exercise jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing allegations of infringement of a Unitary Patent in British
territory.
As it is unclear whether Britain will remain in the UPC post-
Brexit, or how British courts would apply the law with respect
to Unitary Patents if Brexit were to occur before an agreement
had been reached about Britain’s post-Brexit relationship with
90. For an examination of this issue in the U.S. context, see Amy Landers,
U.S. Patent Extraterritoriality within the International Context, 36 REV.OFLIT.
(2016), http://www.thereviewoflitigation.org/36brief28/#r-8.
91. See generally Berne Convention, supra note 32.
92. See generally Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 216
U.N.T.S. 133.
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the Unitary Patent and UPC, it remains questionable how likely
users are to rely on Unitary Patent protection in Britain. With
the post-Brexit status of such patents subject to such uncer-
tainty, it seems likely that many users will instead prefer to opt
for the greater predictability of national patents for protection of
their inventions within Britain.
4. National Registry Offices and Courts
In addition to the pan-EU rights administered by the EUIPO
and the EPO, national patents, designs, and trademarks are
each issued by domestic intellectual property offices in EUMem-
ber States and enforced by the national courts of EU Member
States, with ultimate appeal available to the CJEU. For the re-
maining EU Member States, Brexit should have no impact on
these rights.
In Britain, the UKIPO is the national registry office for pa-
tents, designs, and trademarks. Based in Newport, Wales, the
UKIPO will continue to examine applications for registered
types of intellectual property post-Brexit, and the Great Repeal
Bill makes it likely that EU patent, design, and trademark laws
will be imported wholesale into British law and applied when
the UKIPO is assessing applications. It remains to be seen how
common law interpretations may lead to divergences from EU
laws post-Brexit.
Pre-Brexit, national courts hold jurisdiction over areas of in-
tellectual property such as copyright law subsistence and in-
fringement, as well as design, trademark, and patent registra-
tions and infringements. For the most part, this arrangement
will remain unchanged following Brexit, though the substance
of intellectual property laws being enforced by the courts may
depend on the particular measures put in place to structure the
Britain-EU intellectual property relationship post-Brexit. As
noted above, common law interpretations may also lead to di-
verse evolutions of those laws in Britain and the European Un-
ion.
Unless other transitional arrangements are put in place,
Brexit will render EUTMs, RCDs, and Unregistered Community
Designs (UCD) invalid in Britain, and British courts will no
longer have jurisdiction to determine cases involving EUTMs,
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RCDs or UCDs.93 This will leave holders of EUTMs, RCDs, and
UCDs unprotected in Britain unless they can obtain equivalent
domestic rights, enforcement of foreign judgments, or justiciabil-
ity of EU laws in British courts.
IV. RESTRUCTURING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JURISDICTIONS:
POST-BREXITOPTIONS
The issues outlined above will clearly necessitate new intellec-
tual property arrangements between Britain and the European
Union post-Brexit. Intellectual property law, however, does not
operate in a vacuum. As such, it is important to recognize that
whatever arrangements are selected for the post-Brexit intellec-
tual property relationship between the European Union and
Britain are likely to have been influenced by unrelated consid-
erations. While bargains may be made in which one area of in-
terest is traded off for another, the nature of the international
intellectual property structure, and the economic value to Brit-
ain and the European Union alike of an ongoing harmonized in-
tellectual property relationship, suggest that an integrated in-
tellectual property relationship post-Brexit is likely to be in both
parties’ best interestsK
Intellectual property is one of many issues under consideration
during Brexit negotiations, so the option that would be best vis
a vis intellectual property may not be selected if other impera-
tives prevail. How negotiations may play out is unpredictable.
Setting aside the risk of horse trading and surveying the issues
only from the perspective of the European Union and British in-
terests in maintaining a well harmonized intellectual property
relationship, this Part will examine the options that Brexit ne-
gotiators are likely to consider. It will also refer to the EFTA and
EEA, as several options involve membership of these organiza-
tions.
EFTA is a trade organization that creates a free trade area
that is distinct from the European Union.94 Its members are Ice-
land, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, none of which are
EU Member States. Britain was previously a member of EFTA,
93. UCDs came into effect on March 6, 2002 and provide automatic unitary
rights throughout the European Union when an eligible design is first pub-
lished or used within the European Union. Design Regulation, supra note 55.
94. See generally Convention establishing the European Free Trade Associ-
ation (Stockholm Convention), Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
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but withdrew when it joined the EEC, which later became the
European Union.
A feature that has increased the integration of EU law beyond
the EU’s bordersO and throughout Europe more generallyO is the
European Union’s relationship with the EEAO a free trade organL
ization that was formed in 1994. The EEA combines the Euro-
pean Union and most EFTA nations (except Switzerland) into a
single or 0common market’O95 whose members adopt the EU’s inL
tellectual property acquis. It offers several options for structur-
ing a post-Brexit relationship between the EU and Britain that
is characterized by a high level of intellectual property harmoni-
zation.
A key EEA principle is that of 0regional eShaustion’O under
which an intellectual property holder’s right to prevent importaL
tion of a product falls away once it has been placed on themarket
in the EEA. The result is that intellectual property products can
be moved freely through the EEA once they have been placed on
the market byO or with the consent ofO a rights’ holderK With 85
percent of British exports going to the EuropeanUnion,96 British
business could face difficulties trading into the European Union
if Britain was left outside the EEA following Brexit. A softer
Brexit approach that kept Britain within the EEA and/or EFTA
may alleviate this concern and therefore hold some appeal for
the British negotiators.
Membership of the EEA, however, requires acceptance of the
EU’s core 0four freedoms’ of free movement of capitalO peopleO
goods, and services throughout the European Union,97 and the
European Union has said it will not compromise on these central
95. See Agreement on the European Economic Area, art. 65(2), 1994 O.J. (L
1) 3 [hereinafter EEA Agreement]. Article 65(2) states that: “Protocol :4 and
Annex XVII contain specific provisions and arrangements concerning intellec-
tual, industrial and commercial property, which, unless otherwise specified,
shall apply to all products and servicesK” Id.
96. HMREVENUE&CUSTOMS, UKOVERSEASTRADE STATISTCS 3 (Aug. 2016),
https://www.uktradeinfo.com/Statis-
tics/OTS%20Releases/OTS_Release_0816.pdf.
97. Hor the legal source and etymology of the term “four freedoms”O see ThorL
sten Kingreen, Fundamental Freedoms, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 515, 515@516 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds.,
2009).
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principles.98 It also seems unlikely, particularly given the prom-
inence of immigration in the political campaign that culminated
in a referendum outcome favoring Brexit, that British negotia-
tors would agree to the ongoing free movement of people post-
Brexit. A deadlock on this point could make ongoing British
membership of the EEA unviable. Nonetheless, negotiators
could possibly circumvent this hurdle by finessing the interpre-
tation of “free movement” in relation to people QiKeKO freedom in
name, but not in practice). All possibilities should, therefore, be
considered.
A. The Norway Option
A compromise solution by which Britain would leave the Eu-
ropean UnionO but not the EEAO is collo'uially dubbed “the BorL
way 2ptionK” This would involve Britain rejoining the EFTA as
a way of remaining in the EEA. As all EU Member States are
required to apply to join the EEA, and the EEA also covers the
non-EU EFTA states of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, the
EEAAgreement has the effect of extending EU intellectual prop-
erty law beyond the EU’s bordersK While it does not eStend to
participation in the EUIPO framework,99 membership of the
EEA would offer an opportunity for Britain and the European
Union to retain a greater level of intellectual property harmoni-
zation that would otherwise be likely to exist after Brexit.
Britain is currently a member of the EEA by virtue of its Eu-
ropean Union membership. A potential route by which a post-
BreSit Britain could remain within the EU’s intellectual propL
erty acquismay be for Britain to rejoin the EFTA when it leaves
the European Union, thereby retaining the possibility of remain-
ing within the EEA.100 While this approach is likely to appeal to
some British exporters, it may not be palatable in Britain more
generally, as it would defeat some of the justifications for Brexit.
For example, if it remained within the EEA, Britain would be
98. Hor eSampleO the EU’s chief BreSit negotiatorO Guy .erhofstadtO has reL
portedly warned that splitting the four freedoms would “destroy the union and
its internal marketK” Charlie Peat, P5 1A>> BF bF'&(.ZFH ‘ID I& "^_/H./' 8(A/R
JA+>F' O$F( B(F\A&’T B(%''F>' NFC.&A_&.( 1_(/', SUNDAYEXPRESS (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/717681/Guy-Verhofstadt-European-Union-
EU-Brexit-destroyed-abandons-principles-Theresa-May.
99. The EUIPO involves only EU states.
100. EEA Agreement, supra note 95.
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obliged to implement the EU’s single market laws without havL
ing contributed to making those rules. Britain would also lose
some autonomy, as it would remain subject to EU legislation and
be within the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court. It would also con-
tinue to have to make contributions to the EU budget.101 Given
the emphasis that Britain has placed on its post-Brexit inde-
pendence,102 acceptance of such conditions seems unlikely.
Moreover, a post-Brexit Britain may not be welcome back into
the EEA andJor EHTAK The President of the EHTA’s current
chair, Iceland, has reportedly said his country would welcome
Britain back into the EFTA post-Brexit,103 but Norwegian politi-
cians have given mixed messages about whether their country
might veto such an application.104 It may therefore be that Brit-
ain could not gain re-entry into the EFTA.
101. Modelling by one think-tank has estimated Britain would continue to
pay the majority of its pre-Brexit budgetary contribution to the European Un-
ion under the Norway approach. Nicholas Watt, P5 P\A&9 ‘N.(]_Z .+&A./’
Would Leave UK With 94% of Current Costs, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/16/eu-exit-norway-option-
costs-thinktank.
102. Lancaster House Speech, supra note 19.
103. See Rachel Middleton, Iceland Says It Would Welcome the UK into the
European Free Trade Association Post-Brexit, INT’LBUS. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iceland-says-it-would-welcome-uk-into-european-
free-trade-association-post-brexit-1587272; Iceland Wants UK To Join Nordic
Alliance Of Non-EU Countries, RT (Jun. 30, 2016) https://www.rt.com/busi-
ness/349008-iceland-uk-northern-union/; Rosemary Belson, Icelandic Foreign
Minister to UK: Please Join EFTA, POLITICO (July 9, 2017), http://www.polit-
ico.eu/article/icelandic-foreign-minister-to-uk-please-join-efta/; Szu Ping
Chan, Iceland Opens Door for UK to Join EFTA, TELEGRAPH (July 15, 2017),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/15/iceland-opens-door-uk-join-
efta/.
104. Patrick Wintour, Norway May Block UK Return to European Free Trade
Association, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2016/aug/09/norway-may-block-uk-return-to-european-free-
trade-association; Joachim Dagenborg, N.(]_Z’' 8K 6.D&F/' 6&_/JF ./ B(A&_A/
Joining EFTA, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
britain-eu-efta/norways-pm-softens-stance-on-britain-joining-efta-
idUSKCN10T1E0; Belinda Robinson, N.(]_Z’' P5 1_(/A/C &. 5K9 J.A/A/C
POT" 1.%>H KF_/ ‘BA/HA/C bFJA'A./' I0+.'FH’ ./ B(A&_A/, EXPRESS (Aug. 15,
2017), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/841209/Norway-Erna-Solberg-
Theresa-May-Brexit-joining-European-Free-Trade-Association; Ida Akerstedt,
N.(]_Z !"N’T 6&.+ B(A&_A/ J.A/A/C POT" "D&F( B(F\A&?’5K A' O%( ">>ZT 1F
!_/’& 6_Z N.4’ EXPRESS (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.ex-
press.co.uk/news/world/852607/Brexit-news-latest-EU-EEA-EFTA-Norway-
model-deal-David-Davis-European-Union.
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Even if Britain were to retain membership of the EEA, not all
EU intellectual property rules have been incorporated by that
organization.105 The EHTA website eSplains that this is “primarL
ily due to two-pillar issues related to the granting and enforce-
ment of rights. Other reasons for non-incorporation include acts
dealing with third country relations or acts that pertain to policy
areas falling outside the scope of the EEA AgreementK”106
If, despite these obstacles, the Norway Option were to be ap-
plied, the practical effect on intellectual property arrangements
is likely to be that the European Union and British laws would
be slightly less harmonized post-Brexit than before, but would
nonetheless remain highly harmonized. This is reportedly the
approach the European Union has favored in the immediate af-
termath of Britain triggering Article 50.107
B. The Swiss Approach
If Britain were unwilling or unable to retain EEA membership
post-Brexit, precedent exists for an alternative method of a non-
EU state participating in some aspects of the EU’s intellectual
property acquis. This would involve Britain rejoining the EFTA,
but not the EEA, and negotiating agreements with the European
Union to govern relations post-Brexit.
A <33: referendum in the EHTA’s fourth current memberO
Switzerland, rejected ratification of the EEA Agreement. Swit-
zerland, however, has since concluded a series of bilateral agree-
ments with the European Union108 and has increasingly
105. Council Regulation (EC) No. 612002 creating a Community Design Sys-
tem and Council Regulation (EC) No. 40194 creating a Community Trademark
System have been excluded. See ICELANDMINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Ne-
gotiating Position of Iceland, INTERGOVERNMENTALCONF. ON THEACCESSION OF
ICELAND TO THE EUR. UNION ch. 7 (2010), http://www.mfa.is/me-
dia/ESB/samningskaflar/07/NegPosICEch7_FINAL.pdf.
106. Intellectual Property Rights, EUR. FREE TRADE ASSOC. (2014),
http://www.efta.int/eea/policy-areas/goods/competition-aid-procurement-
ipr/ipr.
107. Simon Marks & Hans von der Burchard, B(%''F>'’ B(F\A& 8>_/9 T(F_& &BF
UK like Norway, POLITICO (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
brussels-suggests-norway-model-for-uk-after-brexit-talks-negotiations/.
108. In addition to the earlier Agreement between the European Economic
Community and the Swiss Confederation 22 July 1972, Switzerland and the
European Union have concluded numerous treaties covering a variety of is-
sues. Switzerland, EUR. COMM. (Feb. 22, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/pol-
icy/countries-and-regions/countries/switzerland/.
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achieved harmonization with EU intellectual property laws
through revisions of Swiss laws.109 Switzerland has also intro-
duced intellectual property laws compatible with EU laws con-
cerning trademarks, neighboring rights and semiconductor to-
pographies.110 In addition, Switzerland is a member of the EPC,
and it has entered into an agreement with the European Union
for mutual respect of geographical indications.111 Switzerland re-
mains outside the EUIPO framework, but in other respects, its
intellectual property laws are relatively well harmonized with
the EU intellectual property acquis.
Even if it remained outside the EEA post-Brexit, Britain could
seek a Swiss-style approach that would nevertheless enable it to
maintain a high level of harmonization with EU intellectual
property laws. Such an arrangement might well suit Britain bet-
ter than the Norway Option, as one of the justifications for
Brexit was a desire to control British laws.112 Switzerland has
arguably done this, and Swiss interpretations of the law have
not always accorded with European Union understandings. For
example, in 1979, the Swiss Federal Court rejected the notion of
regional exhaustion, applying instead the principle of national
exhaustion found in Swiss domestic law.113 Twenty years later,
the Court discussed at length the relationship between Swiss
and EU intellectual property laws, noting differences in inter-
pretation.114
109. European Parliament Directorate General For Internal Policies Briefing
Paper, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Internal Market
beyond the EU: EEA and Switzerland, (European Parliament, Jan. 2010), PE
429.993, 24, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activi-
ties/cont/201003/20100315ATT70636/20100315ATT70636EN.pdf.
110. Tritton & Davis, supra note 43, ¶¶ 1@62.
111. Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confeder-
ation on trade in agricultural products, EC and Switz., June 21, 1999, 2227
U.N.T.S. 199, 236, amended to incorporate Annex 12 (2011).
112. Lancaster House Speech, supra note 19; Vote Leave Campaign Speech,
supra note 52.
113. Bosshard Partners Intertrading AG v. Sunlight AG [1980] 3 C.M.L.R.
664; Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht. Internationaler Teil
(GRUR Int) 1979, 569, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 664.
114. Kodak AG v. Jumbo Markt AG (1999), Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal
Supreme Court (First Division)] Dec. 7, 1999, [2001] [E.N.P.R.] 11 (Switz.). For
a clear summary of this discussion, see Jarrod Tudor, Intellectual Property, the
Free Movement of Goods and Trade Restraint in the European Union, 6 J. OF
BUS., ENTREP. & THE L. 45, 61@63 (2012).
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Harmonization of intellectual property laws has, therefore,
been imperfect between Switzerland and the European Union.
Yet, the degree of integration and engagement remains rela-
tively high. If Britain would like to remain as harmonized as
possible with EU intellectual property laws post-Brexit, but
avoid the European Union actually controlling those laws, the
Swiss Approach offers a method of achieving this goal.
!. TBF T(F_&Z "++(._JB X“1TO "++(._JB” .( “!_/_H_
Approach”)
If Britain is neither a member of the EEA or EFTA post-Brexit,
its exporters are likely to face tariffs and/or non-tariff barriers
when trying to trade with the European Union. Therefore, one
or more treaties will almost certainly be negotiated between the
two jurisdictions. Media commentators are tending to dub this
“the WT2 ApproachO” as it is predicated upon the European UnL
ion and Britain both continuing to be WTO Member States and
thus bound by the standardized legal requirements of WTO
agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement. Elsewhere, this
has been dubbed the “Canada Approach” Qa term attributed to
British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson)115 because the Euro-
pean Union has been negotiating a trade agreement with Can-
ada for some years.116 To avoid confusion, this option might more
simply be named “the Treaty ApproachK”
WTO rules would require the European Union and Britain to
continue affording each other most favored nation status,117
while also granting each other’s people national treatment118 and
115. Stephen Bush, Can the UK Have a Deal with the EU Like Switzerland
or Norway? NEW STATESMAN (June 16, 2016), http://www.newstates-
man.com/politics/uk/2016/06/can-uk-have-deal-eu-switzerland-or-norway.
116. This treaty is called the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) and will remove most tariffs between the European Union and Can-
ada. European Commission Press Release, EU-Canada Trade Agreement En-
ters into Force (Sept. 20, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/in-
dex.cfm?id=1723. Canada signed CETA on October 30, 2016 and it entered into
force provisionally on September 21, 2017, but it must be ratified by national
parliaments of Member States before it will take full effect. Id. Chapter 20
contains intellectual property provisions. EUR. COMM., Ceta Chapter By Chap-
ter, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/.
117. This principle involves affording nationals of the recipient nation trad-
ing advantages that are at least as favorable as those given to any other trad-
ing partner.
118. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 31, art. 2(1). This states:
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priority right post-Brexit.119 Mutual WTO membership would
thus underpin a degree of trading freedom between Britain and
the European Union.
Britain joined the WTO independently, becoming a member of
its predecessor GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) on January 1, 1948, and it will remain a member after
Brexit. The European Commission negotiates and enters inter-
national agreements on behalf of the EU Member States, and
these will cease to apply to Britain post-Brexit. Therefore, Brit-
ain will need to negotiate new arrangements with nations, and
the European Union, with which it would like to have trade
agreements.120 The WTO Director-General, Roberto Azevêdo,
has described Britain’s situation as unprecedentedO foreshadowL
ing a protracted and “tortuous” process in which Britain would
have to renegotiate its trade commitments.121
As noted above, Britain can be expected to negotiate an FTA
with the European Union to take effect post-Brexit,122 and it is
Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other coun-
tries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws
now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals. . . . Conse-
quently, they shall have the same protection as the latter,
and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their
rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed
upon nationals are complied with.
Id.
119. Id. art. 4. Priority right allows a person who has filed in one jurisdiction
to rely on the 0priority date’ of the original filing as the relevant date in subseL
quent jurisdictions in which it files within a specified timeframe. For patents
and designs, this is beneficial because the earlier filing does not defeat novelty.
120. The European Parliament has reportedly threatened to exclude Britain
from EU trade discussions if it commences trade negotiations with non-EU na-
tions prior to Brexit. Maïa de la Baume, MEPs Threaten to Punish UK if it
Starts Pre-Brexit Talks, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.politico.eu/arti-
cle/meps-threaten-to-punish-uk-if-it-starts-pre-brexit-talks/.
121. Shawn Donnan, WTO Warns On Tortuous Brexit Trade Talks, FIN.
TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/745d0ea2-222d-11e6-9d4d-
c11776a5124d; Larry Elliott, WTO Chief Says Post-Brexit Trade Talks Must
Start From Scratch, GUARDIAN (Jun. 7, 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/business/2016/jun/07/wto-chief-brexit-trade-talks-start-scratch-eu-
referendum.
122. A complication may be that, under EU rules, the European Union has
the exclusive competence to conduct trade negotiations on behalf of its Member
States. TFEU, supra note 26, art. 3. To avoid breaching EU law, Britain may
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common for FTAs to include detailed intellectual property
clauses.123 In theory, but dependent on what is ultimately
agreed, this would enable Britain and the European Union to
maintain similar intellectual property arrangements to those
currently in force. While it would necessitate some amendments
to EU laws, an agreement between Britain and the European
Union could conceivably be negotiated to enable Britain to re-
main a participant in EU intellectual property institutions, such
as the EUIPO. Various issues would need to be addressed, such
as the aforementioned risk of disparities in judicial interpreta-
tion. The flexibility of this approach, however, may ultimately
allow the parties to negotiate a bespoke settlement that main-
tains maximum integration of European Union and British in-
tellectual property arrangements.
V. LOOKING FORWARD
“The brutal truth is that Brexit will be a loss for all of us . . . I
am afraid that no such outcome exists that will benefit either
sideK”124
While European Council president Donald Tusk was referring
to Brexit generally when he spoke those words, they seem par-
ticularly pertinent in the context of intellectual property ar-
rangements in the European Union and Britain. Several factors
may influence whether Brexit will, in hindsight, be judged to
have benefitted Britain and/or the European Union with respect
to intellectual property in the longer term. This Part will con-
sider some of these factors and contemplate whether Brexit
could ultimately lead to an expansion of the reach and influence
of the EU’s intellectual property acquis.
therefore have to wait until after Brexit before it can enter into FTAs in its
own right.
123. European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy
Briefing: Does ACTA still matter? Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in In-
ternational Trade, EXPO/B/INTA/2013/26, ch. 3 (2013); Maximiliano Santa
Cruz S., Intellectual Property Provisions in European Union Trade Agreements:
Implications for Developing Countries, ch. 2 (ICTSD IPRs and Sustainable De-
velopment Issue Paper No. 20, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development, June 2007).
124. Tusk, supra note 27.
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A. 7%_(_/&A/A/C B(F\A&’' I/&F>>FJ&%_> Property Negotiations
One of the initial questions to be asked is: will intellectual
property issues be determined on their own merits during Brexit
negotiations? This raises strategic issues about how Britain and
the European Union will negotiate post-Brexit intellectual prop-
erty arrangements, and whether negotiations about these mat-
ters will be quarantined from considerations about other aspects
of their post-Brexit relationship.
The European Union is in an awkward position. On the one
hand, continuing to include Britain in as much of the pre-Brexit
intellectual property acquis as possible would appear to be the
best way for the European Union to continue to prosecute the
goals originally voiced in the Schuman Declaration of 1950,
which it has since pursued through its intellectual property har-
monization project.
On the other hand, the European Commission president, Jean-
Claude EunckerO has described BreSit as an “eSistential threat”
to the European Union,125 and EU leaders are anxious to deter
copycat exits by other Member States and/or the possible disin-
tegration of the European Union.126 For this reason, EU negoti-
ators will be keen to avoid rewarding, or being perceived to re-
ward, Britain with an outcome that lets it benefit from Brexit
when compared with its pre-Brexit position or the positions of
Member States remaining within the European Union. Indeed,
leaders of various EUMember States have been forceful in their
insistence that Britain must not be permitted to pick and choose
125. Peter Foster & James Rothwell, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European
Commission President, Suggests UK Will Not Have Access to Single Market Af-
ter Brexit, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/2016/09/13/eu-facing-an-existential-threat-in-the-wake-of-
brexit-jean-claud/.
126. Member States that EU leaders fear might vote to leave the European
Union are: Sweden, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Hungary, and France.
See: Rick Noack, These Countries Could Be Next Now That Britain Has Left
the E.U., WASH. POST (June 24, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/23/these-countries-could-be-next-if-
britain-leaves-the-e-u/.
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which bits of EU membership it would like to jettison and re-
tain.127 Others have spoken about the need to punish Britain for
deciding to leave the European Union.128
With respect to intellectual property law, such a hardline and
inflexible approach might be shortsighted. First, populist deci-
sions about whether to withdraw from the European Union are
far more likely to be driven by issues such as nationalism, immi-
gration, and/or grievance than intellectual property arrange-
ments, which almost certainly have no influence on the decisions
of the vast majority of voters. Second, if other Member States
were to decide to leave and the European Union started to dis-
integrate, preserving a strong intellectual property acquis that
encompasses as many countries as possible would be a key way
of helping to maintain a de facto union between the European
nationsK It was “common foundations for economic development”
that Schuman dreamed would unify Europe and create an inte-
grated stable and peaceful continent.129 The EU’s intellectual
property acquis has become one of those foundations, and it
could persist even if other aspects of the modern European Un-
ion were to fall away.
Thus, as much as possible, intellectual property aspects of
post-Brexit arrangements should be negotiated on their own
terms. The negotiators should be attentive to the constitutive
structures of intellectual property laws and should be careful not
to damage the internal coherence of those laws through horse-
trading about other interests. Although such bargaining is com-
mon during trade negotiations,130 both parties share common in-
terests in the maintenance of a stable intellectual property
127. Peter Walker, "/CF>_ KF(?F>9 TBF(F'_ K_Z !_//.& ‘!BF((Z 8AJ?’ B(F\A&
Terms, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brexit-angela-merkel-theresa-may-cannot-
cherry-pick-terms-latest-eu-uk-a7458486.html; David Phinnemore, Why the
5K !_/’& J%'& 8AJ? _/H !B..'F D(.0 &BF P5 KF/% "D&F( B(F\A&, CONVERSATION
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://theconversation.com/why-the-uk-cant-just-pick-and-
choose-from-the-eu-menu-after-brexit-64777.
128. See, e.g., Chapman supra note 38; Cowburn, supra note 38.
129. Schuman Declaration, supra note 39.
130. For discussions of linkage bargaining in an intellectual property context,
see generally MICHAEL PATRICK RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12@13, 18, 92
(1998); Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplo-
macy of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 535 (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
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framework after Brexit occurs. Both the European Union and
Britain are likely to enjoy mutual longer-term benefits if intel-
lectual property laws are negotiated independently of other is-
sues in the lead up to Brexit and if a seamless collaborative ar-
rangement can be put in place post-Brexit.
B. Laying EU Foundations for Global Intellectual Property
Harmonization?
It is even conceivable that Brexit could open the door to new
possibilities that, in due course, could give rise to a territorially
larger, harmonized EU intellectual property system than before.
Global intellectual propertization has gone through the follow-
ing various phases: the development of modern intellectual prop-
erty concepts in Western Europe several hundred years ago, the
transmission of those laws around the world through coloniza-
tion, and the standardization of intellectual property principles
in national laws across the world as jurisdictions signed up to
treaty terms.131 This trend has been described as Europe “shapL
ing the global [intellectual property] regime in its own image,
even if global rules are not a carbon copy of EU rulesK”132
Within Europe, the trend has gone further, as the European
Union has bit-by-bit harmonized intellectual property laws
throughout twenty-eight separate nations. Ansgar Ohly com-
ments thatO “we have reached a stage where the re-nationaliza-
tion of intellectual property law in Europe would cause prohibi-
tive costs. There is no way backK K K K”133 If Ohly is correct, it may
be because so many powerful stakeholders benefit from the Eu-
ropean Union’s harmoniRation of intellectual property lawsO and
GLOBALIZATIONOF INTELLECTUALPROPERTYRIGHTS (2003); José E. Alvarez, The
WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 (2002).
131. For discussions of this history, see, e.g., Peter Drahos, Developing Coun-
tries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, UK Commis-
sion on Intellectual Property Rights Study Paper No. 8, 7@10 (2002),
www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp8_drahos_study.pdf; Al-
exandra George, The (In)Justice of Globalisation by Intellectual Propertisation,
ARCHIV FÜRRECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 109, 17@31 (2007).
132. Conclusion: The Role of the EU in the Legal Dimension of Global Gov-
ernance, in THE EU’S ROLE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE LEGAL 325, 337 (Bart
Van Vooren et al., 2013).
133. Angsar Ohly, Concluding Remarks: Postmodernism and Beyond, in THE
EUROPEANIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
LEGALMETHODOLOGY 255, 256 (Angsar Ohly & Justine Pila, eds., 2013).
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there is therefore a lack of political will to unwind levels of intel-
lectual property protection in Europe. It may also reflect the
enormous investment by governments and businesses alike that
has been devoted to establishing the current system and operat-
ing within it.
This article does not advocate territorial expansion of the EU’s
intellectual property =urisdictionK The EU’s intellectual property
acquis has detractors, with strong critiques being made against
various aspects of the EU’s intellectual property lawsK Rather
than expansion of its scope, there are also intellectual property
minimalists who would prefer to see a weakening of the layers
of intellectual property laws that have come to cloak contempo-
rary life in Europe and around much of the globe.134 The political
reality, however, is that twenty-first century governments
throughout Europe, and in much of the rest of the world, have
tended to be broadly supportive of intellectual property laws,
with the European Union also strongly promoting this agenda.
While some treaties with intellectual property provisions have
fallen by the wayside,135 the number of state signatories to intel-
lectual property-specific treaties has generally been increasing,
not falling, and there has been a trend towards including intel-
lectual property chapters in bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements (e.g., FTAs) and investment treaties. Despite oppo-
nents, the standardization of intellectual property laws through-
out the European Union and the rest of the world has been grow-
ing steadily as a result of governmental decisions.
Against this backdrop, it makes practical sense for states to
design their intellectual property laws and bureaucracies to be
134. For a discussion of the intellectual property minimalist/maximalist po-
sitions, see, e.g., Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeit-
ing and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play. (PIJIP Research Paper
No. 15. 2010), http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/15/; Peter Yu,
Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1
(2005).
135. Examples include the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
which was signed by numerous nations in 2011 and 2012, but which has failed
to reach the required six ratifications to come into effect, and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP or TPPA), which was signed by many nations,
but which the U.S. has withdrawn from in 2017, and which has only been rat-
ified by Japan. See, e.g., Stephanie Anderson, TPP: Government Scrambles to
Salvage Trans-Pacific Partnership after Donald Trump Pulls US Out, ABC
(Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-24/donald-trump-tpp-fed-
eral-government/8207250.
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as competitive, and as attractive to users, as possible. It is plau-
sible that considerations, such as the high costs of running ad-
ministrative bodies and the efficiencies gained from larger juris-
dictions, might prompt some nations to take steps towards har-
monizing their intellectual property systems.136
If Britain is able to remain, de jure or de facto, within all or
part of the EU’s intellectual property acquis post-Brexit, a prec-
edent will be set that indirectly harmonizes intellectual property
laws inside the European Union and beyond. This might forge a
path that ultimately allows other non-EU nations to participate
in a similar manner, thus resulting in a creeping harmonization
of EU intellectual property laws beyond the European Union.
Might Brexit, therefore, be the harbinger of a new era of intel-
lectual property globalization?
C. Precedents for Harmonization via Supra-Territorial
Registries
A limited type of international harmonization has long oc-
curred when nations have shared aspects of intellectual property
bureaucracies.
136. Various examples of international intellectual property harmonization
projects can be found. These include, first, discussions between Australia and
New Zealand to harmonize trademark and/or patent laws: see, e.g., Australia
and New Zealand in Talks to Harmonize IP, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Dec. 19,
2014), http://www.managingip.com/Article/1258602/Australia-and-New-Zea-
land-in-talks-to-harmonize-IP.html; SUSY FRANKEL & MEGAN RICHARDSON,
Trans-Tasman Intellectual Property Coordination, in LEARNING FROM THE
PAST, ADAPTING FOR THE FUTURE: REGULATORY REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND 527@
553 (Susy Frankel ed. 2011); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, HARMONISATION OF LEGAL
SYSTEMS: WITHIN AUSTRALIA AND BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ¶¶
3.121@3.136 (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia; Nov. 2006).
A second example would be the cooperation between IP Australia and the
USPTO, according to which the former acts as an international search and ex-
amination authority for international patent applications filed with the latter
via the PCT. See Amanda Jones, International report—Harmonisation: Are We
One Step Closer?, INT’L ASSET MGMT. (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.iam-me-
dia.com/reports/detail.aspx?g=3a4ff152-d5aa-4538-8fb0-894a8aeaac50. A
third example would be a proposal by Adrian Sterling to harmonize copyright
laws throughout the Asia-Pacific region with an Asian Pacific Copyright Code,
which was the subject of the 2016 Asian Pacific Copyright Association Confer-
ence. Asian Pacific Copyright Code Proposal for Discussion,
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3Vaav-YAZ6RbkFLaUQ4aEYwMk0/view.
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The joint intellectual property office of the Benelux nations
(BOIP)137 and the Patent Office of the Cooperation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf138 are examples of regional harmoni-
zation. These administrative offices grant rights that are valid
in all participating statesK IndeedO B2IP’s role eStends far beL
yond Europe, as it also implements the BES Trademarks Act139
for the Caribbean Netherlands, comprising the three Dutch mu-
nicipalities of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba located in the
Caribbean Sea.
SimilarlyO the 0outermost regions’ Q2MRP of the European Un-
ion are territories that may be located at some geographic dis-
tance from Europe, but that nonetheless remain part of the Eu-
ropean Union. These include French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Mar-
tinique, Mayotte, Réunion, and the Collectivity of Saint Martin
(all of which are part of France), the Canary Islands (Spain), and
Azores and Madeira (parts of the Portuguese Republic). The
2MR are governed by EU lawO including the EU’s intellectual
property acquis.
A related example of international intellectual property har-
monization is the mechanism of re-registration that remains
from colonial times in some parts of the world. For instance, in
the South Pacific region, which is half way around the world
from Europe, French national trademark registrations apply if
re-registered in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and the Wal-
lis & Futuna Islands,140 while British trademark re-registra-
tions apply in Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.141
137. The Benelux Office for Intellectual Property covers Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Luxembourg. See generally BENELUX OFF. FOR INTELL. PROP.,
http://www.boip.int (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
138. The Patent Office of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the
Gulf covers the States of United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the
State of Kuwait. See generally PATENTOFF. OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR
THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, http://www.gccpo.org/DefaultEn.aspx (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2017).
139. Trademarks Act for the BES Islands (Wet Merken BES), CARIBLE.NL,
http://www.caribie.nl/sites/www.caribie.nl/files/gebruiker10/af-
beeldingen/2012.03.26-trademarks_act_for_the_bes_islands.pdf.
140. Tracey Berger, Trade Mark Registration in the Pacific Islands, SPRUSON
AND FERGUSON INTELL. PROP. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.spruson.com/trade-
mark-registration-in-the-pacific-islands/.
141. For details of the extension of British intellectual property rights to
other territories, see EXTENSION OF UK INTELL. PROP. RTS. ABROAD, GOV.UK,
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During the days of the British Empire, its patent re-registra-
tion system stretched to over thirty colonies around the world.142
A proposed Empire Patent that would have covered all British
colonies never eventuated,143 but Peter Drahos has drawn an
analogy between the Empire Patent and Europe’s EP2O144 which
extends to thirty-eight Member States.
In the cases of joint intellectual property offices, of decisions of
intellectual property offices on one side of the world applying di-
rectly to territories on the other side of the world, and of re-reg-
istration of rights, intellectual property agencies already make
decisions that apply in jurisdictions beyond their territorial bor-
ders. Several precedents therefore exist for international harmo-
nization-type projects in which an administrative office in one
jurisdictionmakes decisions with respect to intellectual property
in multiple jurisdictions in different parts of the world.
D. An Alternative to Top-Down Intellectual Property
Harmonization Projects?
Is it possible that the global harmonization of intellectual
property laws via an expansion of the jurisdiction of EU laws in
this area might succeed where earlier projects have failed?
Various proposals to internationally harmonize particular ar-
eas of intellectual property law have been mooted in the past,
but have tended to fall by the wayside.
Perhaps the most ambitious project was an attempt to estab-
lish a world patent system. In 2001, the World Intellectual Prop-
erty 2rganiRation’s Standing Committee on the Caw of Patents
drafted a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), but work on
this project was put on hold in 2006 due to a lack of consensus.145
Commenting on opposition to the SPLT proposal and challenges
(July 25, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extension-of-uk-
intellectual-property-rights-abroad.
142. Peter Drahos, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT
OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 142@143 (2010).
143. Christopher Wadlow, The British Empire Patent 1901E1923: The
‘N>.^_>’ 8_&F/& TB_& NF$F( 1_', 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. (2006) 311@346.
144. Drahos, supra note 142, at 142.
145. Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/draft_splt.htm (last visited April 24, 2017).
See also Emma Barraclough, Patent Harmonization Push by Developed World,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 10@11 (2004-2005).
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posed by emerging technologies, Jerome Reichmann and Ro-
chelle Cooper Zreyfuss argued that: “a deep harmoniRation
would boomerang against even its developed country promoters
by creating more problems than it would solve. There is no vision
of a properly functioning patent system for the developed world
that commands even the appearance of a consensusK”146
The SPLT was a top-down attempt by the few, notably the
world’s largest patent offices, the European Union, United
States, and Japan, collectively known as the Trilaterals with re-
spect to patent policy,147 to produce a global patent system that
would harmonize patent law for the many.148 It attracted re-
sistance.149
Some aspects of patent law have nonetheless become quite
standardized through membership of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT), which allows patent applicants to file a single in-
ternational application to seek patents in up to 152 contracting
states,150 and the Patent Law Treaty (PLT), which harmonizes
formal procedural requirements among thirty-nine contracting
states.151 In an environment in which administrative aspects of
146. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization With-
out Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, 57 DUKE L. J. 58 (2007).
147. For a discussion of the Trilaterals, see Drahos, supra note 142, ch. 6.
148. Global Patents for World Domination? GRAIN (Oct. 1, 2003),
https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/405-global-patents-for-world-domina-
tion.
149. See, e.g., KSHITIJ KUMAR SINGH, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 132@133 (2014); SANGEETA
SHASHIKANT, THE SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY: THE DANGERS OF GLOBAL
PATENT POLICY HARMONIZATION (2009); Philippe Baechtold & Tomoko Miya-
moto, International Patent Law Harmonization: A Search for the Right Bal-
ance, 10 J. OF INTELL. PROP. RTS. 177 (May 2005); One Global Patent System?
1I8O’' 6%^'&_/&A$F 8_&F/& L_] T(F_&Z, GRAIN (Aug. 4, 2003),
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/109-one-global-patent-system-wipo-s-
substantive-patent-law-treaty; WI8O K.$F' T.]_(H “1.(>H” 8_&F/& 6Z'&F0,
GRAIN (July 2002), https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2116-wipo-moves-to-
ward-world-patent-system; Biswajit Dhar & R. V. Anuradha, Substantive Pa-
tent Law Treaty: What It Means for India, 40 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 1346
(2005).
150. World Intellectual Property Organization, PCT—The International Pa-
tent System, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
151. See generally Summary of the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) (2000), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/plt/. For a list of con-
tracting parties, see WPOEAdministered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
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patent law are already strongly harmonized under the PCT and
PLT, and a degree of substantive legal standardization has de-
veloped under the TRIPS Agreement, some non-EU nations
might find it efficient and/or pragmatic to piggyback on a strong
existing patent registration system and thus avoid having to
maintain domestic patent examination and registration infra-
structure. Expansion of the Unitary Patent to non-EU nations
could provide an opportunity to do this, while the addition of an
international patent court, such as the prospective EPC, could
make the system additionally attractive. Meanwhile, other na-
tions would undoubtedly want to maintain the maximum flexi-
bilities allowed to developing countries under TRIPS,152 or would
be unwilling to replace national patent principles with EU law,
and would opt to stay outside the EU’s TRIPS Plus frameworkK
Opening membership of its patent framework to non-EU na-
tions could help the European Union achieve goals it had sought
by promoting the SPLT. So long as sovereign nations were not
put under pressure to join, for example, during FTA negotia-
tions, it might attract less resistance because its existence would
not depend on achieving consensus. That is, non-EU nations
could choose to join if they wanted to comply with rules of the
established system, or not join, according to their preference.
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=4 (last
visited Oct. 22, 2017).
152. For a discussion of developing countries’ use of fleSibilitiesO see Hlorian
Rabitz, Explaining Institutional Change in International Patent Politics, 35
THIRDWORLDQ. 1582 (2014).
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Equivalent projects to the SPLT have not yet sought to harmo-
nize trademarks,153 design,154 or copyright155 law internation-
ally. Similar considerations, however, would apply to these other
areas of intellectual property law.
A discussion of the general pros and cons of global intellectual
property harmonization is beyond the scope of an article on the
implications of Brexit. Suffice it to say here that, while many
would oppose what might be seen as neo-imperialism by the Eu-
ropean Union through the expansion of its intellectual property
153. For discussions of global trademark harmonization, see Kenneth L.
Port, Trademark Harmonization: Norms, Names & Nonsense 2 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV.. 33 (1998); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World Of International
Trademark Law 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1998); Hugo Mock, Is an In-
ternational Trade-Mark Law Desirable Now, 40 TRADEMARKREP. 3 (1950); Ed-
ward S. Rogers & Stephen P. Ladas, Proposals for Uniform Trade-Mark Laws,
40 TRADEMARK REP. 8 (1950).
154. For a discussion of global design law harmonization, see Susanna
Monseau, The Challenge of Protecting Industrial Design in a Global Economy
20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 495, 520 (2011@2012). This states that:
There are now four agreements and two organizations at the
international level that are relevant to the protection of in-
dustrial design. None of them provide a completely agreed-
upon international standard for the protection of design and
their history illustrates the continuing conflict on many is-
sues related to industrial design. However, despite the confu-
sion and points of disagreement, some tentative areas of
emerging harmonization can be divined from the interna-
tional efforts to protect industrial design.
Id.
155. For discussions of global copyright harmonization, see Marketa Trimble,
The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws on the Internet, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 339 (2015); Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright:
O(.0 " ‘B%/H>F’ .D N_&A./_> !.+Z(ACB& L_]' &. " 6%+(_/_&A./_> !.HF#, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S.A. 265 (2000); Christian A. Camarce, Harmonization of
International Copyright Protection in the Internet Age, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 435 (2006); Ysolde Gendreau, Copyright Harmoniza-
tion in the European Union and in North America, 20 COLUM.- V.L.A. J.L. &
ARTS 37 (1995@1996); Michael D. Birnhack, Global Copyright, Local Speech, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 571 (2006@:II5P Qstating: “What does it mean
that copyright is globalized? This Part outlines the nature of G© and argues
that G© is not a unified body of law, but rather is a complex web of inter-related
layers of international law applied locally within the existing legal, political,
and cultural environment. This local application renders the idea of a unified
global law a fictionK”PK
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jurisdiction beyond Europe,156 some might find it beneficial.157
For example, the infrastructure cost of maintaining a patent reg-
istry is a well-recognized impost for many nations, developed158
and developing159 alike. For some such nations, using an estab-
156. For discussions of various viewpoints against the spread of developed
nation intellectual property standards throughout the world, see, e.g.,
Akalemwa Ngenda, The Nature of the International Intellectual Property Sys-
tem: Universal Norms and Values or Western Chauvinism? 14 INFO. & COMM.
TECH. L. 59-79 (2005); Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen, Harmonisation
or differentiation in intellectual property protection? The lessons of history,
23(2) PROMETHEUS 131@147 (2007). For references to the internationalization
or globalization of intellectual property standards as neo-colonialism or neo-
imperialism, see, e.g., Andreas Rahmatian, Neo-Colonial Aspects of Global In-
tellectual Property Protection 12(1) J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 40-74 (2009);
Ikechi Mgbeoji, TBF !.0+(_H.( !.0+>F\9 "D(AJ_’' I8R P>A&FT NF.-colonialism
and the Enduring Control of African IPR Agenda by External Interests 26 I.P.J.
313@330 (2014); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Bio-
piracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual
Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LED. STUD. 11 (1998).
157. For insight into reasons for such viewpoints, see, e.g., Drahos, supra note
142, ch. 12; Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Global-
ization: The Necessity and Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARKOFF. SOC’Y 127@166 (2011); Robert M. Sherewood, Why A Uniform
Intellectual Property SystemMakes Sense for the World, in GLOBALDIMENSIONS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 68 (Mitchel B.
Wallerstein et. al. eds., 1993); Kate H. Murashige, Symposium: Intellectual
Property: Article: Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L. L.
591(1994); Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now -The Case for Patent Har-
monization, 20 N.C.J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 291 (1995); Gerald J. Mossinghof
& Vivian Ku, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529 (1998).
158. See, e.g., Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compro-
mise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and
_ 8(.+.'_> D.( _ “OA('&-To-I/$F/&” P\JF+&A./ D.( b.0F'&AJ "++>AJ_/&', 11 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J.259, 261@262 (2002@:II9P Q“The establishment of a global
patent system has become an urgent necessity for patent offices in advanced
industrial countries, particularly the United States, Japan, and Europe. The
number of patent applicants seeking protection outside of the country of origin
has drastically increased because of market globalization. When the patenta-
ble subject matter in areas such as biotechnology and computer software was
expanded, the number of patent applications in those areas increased, as did
the level of education necessary for examiners of such subject matter. . . . In
short, the USPTO will not survive without implementing a system to reduce
this administrative burdenK”P Qinternal citations omittedPK
159. For a discussion of this point, see, e.g., Robert M. Sherwood, Vanda Scar-
tezini & Peter Dirk Siemsen, Promotion Of Inventiveness In Developing Coun-
tries Through A More Advanced Patent Administration, 39 J. L. & TECH. 473,
478@485 (1999); Drahos, supra note 142.
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lished intellectual property registration system of another juris-
dictionmay involve an acceptable trade-off, where decision-mak-
ing sovereignty with respect to that area of intellectual property
could be conceded in return for greater efficiency and cost-sav-
ing. Particularly when countries already have high levels of
standardization in their intellectual property laws as a result of
international treaties or their legal traditions, a government
might conclude that such a compromise is reasonable and in the
national interest.
If non-EU nations were able to make a bottom-up choice to opt
into EU intellectual property registration systems, and perhaps
also into dedicated courts like the EPC, the effect would be to
extend harmonization of EU intellectual property law further
throughout the globe. This might be an unintended and contro-
versial consequence of Brexit, but it would arguably serve the
European Union’s traditional goal of promoting peace through
economic unification.160
E. Brexit as a Trigger for Global Intellectual Property
Harmonization?
Could an international harmonization approach be applied to
extend the jurisdiction of EU intellectual property rights, such
as the EUTM, RCD, UCD, and UPC beyond EU territory? To the
extent that Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and, Switzerland en-
gage with the EU’s intellectual property acquis,161 there are in-
direct steps in this direction. If Britain were to have a soft Brexit
with respect to intellectual property and were to continue to par-
ticipate, for example, in the EUTM and/or the Unitary Patent
and UPC, the effect would be to extend the application of EU
intellectual property laws directly into territories beyond the
European Union’s physical bordersK If the EUTMO RCZO UCZ
and/or UPC were to be extended to Britain, it is conceivable that
the European Union may, in time, open them to other EEA and
EFTA nations. In due course, it may even open them to non-
EEA/EFTA nations.
Applying this approach more widely could also help the Euro-
pean Union to limit the effects of other nations following Britain
160. Schuman Declaration, supra note 39.
161. Even if their national equivalents are harmonized with the EU law,
those states do not directly participate in the EUTM, RCD, UCD, or the UPC.
See discussion supra Part IV.
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to the exit. If Member States were able to depart from the Euro-
pean UnionO yet remain part of the EU’s intellectual property
frameworks, intellectual property harmonization would no
longer be reliant on membership of the European Union or a
state’s physical presence in EuropeK This situation would take
time to eventuate, and it would require substantial reconstitu-
tion of the establishing instruments of the European Union’s
various intellectual property arrangements. Such an outcome,
however, could help mitigate against the existential threat of
disintegration that some in the European Union fear.
Moreover, it is feasible that any nation could eventually opt in
to participating in a supra-EU intellectual property acquis. As
intellectual property registrations in some EU nations already
apply in countries on the other side of the world, this scenario
seems plausible. Perhaps, in time, consideration would even be
given to whether EUTMs and/or RCDs could be registered for
application in jurisdictions as far flung as Australia, the United
States, India, and/or China. If so, maybe they would one day be
rebadged as “global trademarks” and “global designsK” Maybe
the eSpansion of the Unitary Patent into a “global patent” and
international intellectual property courts modeled on the UPC
would also develop. The effect would be the evolution of global
intellectual property registration institutions and/or courts from
supra-national foundations originally laid in EU law. This would
help to overcome significant jurisdictional problems encountered
by businesses seeking to enforce intellectual property rights in
multiple jurisdictions across the world.
Such conjecture raises tantalizing questions about whether, in
fact, the jurisdiction of EU intellectual property laws might
eventually be extended around the world to many more non-EU
nations. Without the benefit of a crystal ball, it is impossible to
do more than speculate as to whether the EU’s intellectual propL
erty acquis might one day form the foundation for harmonized
supra-national intellectual property systems. Perhaps the UPC
will become an international patent court, and perhaps it will be
a model for specialist international courts with jurisdiction over
other areas of intellectual property law. Given that the Euro-
pean Union has been active in promoting abroad its vision of in-
tellectual property through treaty negotiations in the past, it is
not inconceivable that it might come to promote global harmoni-
Ration through an eStension of the EU’s intellectual property
frameworks to other nations in the future.
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Such a development could require some attitudinal shift
within the European Union about the role of its intellectual
property structures, and other sovereign nations would need to
conclude that the benefits of joining harmonized intellectual
property systems would outweigh the loss of legal autonomy as-
sociated with participating in international ventures of this na-
ture. Such transformations do not seem imminent, but nor do
they seem beyond the realms of possibility.
CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the restructuring of the intellectual
property relationship between the European Union and Britain
that will need to occur as a result of Brexit, and it has considered
implications of these changes. It has provided historical and le-
gal context for the negotiations that are now underway, and it
has examined options that are open to the negotiators. These in-
clude the Norway Option, the Swiss Approach, and the Treaty
Approach. The article has offered insight into a multitude of
strategic considerations, such as logistic and political pros and
cons of various alternatives, that will affect the likelihood that
they are adopted.
The ways in which Britain and the European Union view these
issues will shape policy decisions concerning Brexit and intellec-
tual property law. The ways in which their representatives ad-
dress these considerations during negotiations will forge the in-
tellectual property relationship between Britain and the Euro-
pean Union for years to come. With the European Union cur-
rently having one of the world’s largest economiesO and Europe
having become a hub of international intellectual property activ-
ity, this will, in turn, have widespread implications in a global-
ized world.
As well as examining the amendments that will need to be
made to intellectual property jurisdiction in Britain and the Eu-
ropean Union as a result of Brexit, this article has considered
the possibility that Brexit might inadvertently spark a new era
of global intellectual property harmonization. It has speculated
as to ways in which this could eventuate if Britain were to nego-
tiate a soft Brexit with respect to intellectual property arrange-
ments with the European Union, even if the talks were to result
in a hard Brexit in other respects. It has concluded that, if this
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were to occur, Brexit could ultimately lead to an expansion, ra-
ther than a shrinkingO of the EU’s intellectual property =urisdicL
tion.
Brexit was accompanied by a wave of fear about its fragmen-
tary implications. In years to come, it would certainly be ironic
if Brexit were to have resulted, not in a shrinking of the territory
covered by the EU’s intellectual property =urisdictionsO but in the
territorial eStension of the EU’s intellectual property =urisdicL
tion. Perhaps the possibility that EU intellectual property law
could, in time, come to apply directly in many other nations
throughout the world will encourage EU negotiators to think
ambitiously and 0go long’ and soft when restructuring its intelL
lectual property jurisdiction and relationship with Britain post-
Brexit.162
162. This article was completed in May 2017. Several developments have oc-
curred between that time and the journal going to press in late 2017. As these
events are ongoing, their consequences are not yet clear. Key developments
include the commencement of Brexit negotiations between Britain and the Eu-
ropean Union on June 19, 2017, and a challenge to German ratification of the
UPC. See supra text accompanying note 66; see also Aria Bendix, Brexit Nego-
tiations Begin, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2017), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/news/archive/2017/06/brexit-negotiations-begin/530901/.
